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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of essays on organizational economics and finance-related topics.
Firms and individuals who sell opinions may bias their reports for either behavioral or strate-
gic reasons. Chapter 1 proposes a new methodology for measuring these biases, particularly
whether opinion producers under or over emphasize their private information, i.e. whether they
herd or exaggerate their differences with the consensus. Applying the methodology to I/B/E/S
analysts reveals that they do not herd as is often assumed, but rather they exaggerate their
differences with the consensus by an average factor of about 2.4. Analysts also overweight their
prior-period private information and thus under-update based on last period's forecast error;
this under-updating helps explain the apparently conflicting over and under-reaction results
of DeBondt and Thaler (1990) and Abarbanell and Bernhard (1992). A useful by-product of
the methodology is a measure of the incremental information content of an analyst's forecasts.
Using this measure reveals that analysts differ greatly in performance: the information content
of the future forecasts of the top 10 percent of analysts is roughly six times that of the bottom
40 percent.
Chapter 2 examines whether career concerns can create an incentive for opinion-producing
agents to exaggerate. We find that they can, the reason being that high-ability agents have
opinions that are more different from the consensus on average and potential clients will learn
more quickly about how different an agent's opinions are from the consensus on average that
about whether or not they are exaggerating. The model predicts that agents should exaggerate
more when they are under-rated by their clients, when the realizations of the variables they
are forecasting are expected to be especially noisy, and when they expect to make fewer future
forecasts. We find that these predictions are consistent with the empirical data on equity
analyst's earnings forecasts.
In models by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), firms competing in quantities
benefit strategically from commiting to managerial incentives that are biased toward revenue
maximization. Little empirical evidence has been produced in support of these models, and their
assumption that incentive contracts are observable has been criticized as unrealistic. Chapter
3 proposes an alternative model in which firms competing in strategic substitutes commit
to using less precise profit measures, which biases the optimal unobservable contract towards
revenue maximization. This model performs better empirically. Firms that compete in strategic
substitutes choose less precise profit measures across six different measures, and firms with less
precise profit measures in turn have stock returns and thus managerial incentives that are driven
2
more by revenue growth.
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Chapter 1
Measuring herding and exaggeration
by equity analysts
Summary 1 Firms and individuals who sell opinions may bias their reports for either behav-
ioral or strategic reasons. Chapter 1 proposes a new methodology for measuring these biases,
particularly whether opinion producers under or over emphasize their private information, i.e.
whether they herd or exaggerate their differences with the consensus. Applying the methodology
to I/B/E/S analysts reveals that they do not herd as is often assumed, but rather they exaggerate
their differences with the consensus by an average factor of about 2.4. Analysts also overweight
their prior-period private information and thus under-update based on last period's forecast er-
ror; this under-updating helps explain the apparently conflicting over and under-reaction results
of DeBondt and Thaler (1990) and Abarbanell and Bernhard (1992). A useful by-product of
the methodology is a measure of the incremental information content of an analyst's forecasts.
Using this measure reveals that analysts differ greatly in performance: the information content
of the future forecasts of the top 10 percent of analysts is roughly six times that of the bottom
40 percent.
6
1.1 Introduction
Each recent financial crisis has renewed concerns that financial market participants face in-
centives to underweight or even ignore their private information and herd with the existing
consensus. In both finance and general management, when a group is collectively surprised by
an event, outside observers often worry that they have been practicing "group think" and herd-
ing on each other's opinions. In practice, it is very difficult to determine whether a group has
been surprised because they were herding and ignoring the warning signs or because warning
signs simply were either not available or too weak to be rationally taken seriously. Nonetheless,
we would like know whether herding occurs, so that consumers and organizations can adjust
the way they use information or even alter contracts to diminish the incentives that foster it.
This paper proposes a new methodology to measure how much forecasters downplay or
exaggerate their differences with the consensus. Although it is impossible to determine whether
a forecaster has herded on any given observation, our methodology allows us to draw a statistical
inference about how much herding has occurred on average across a set of observations. We
apply this methodology to equity analysts' earnings forecasts and find that analysts do not
herd, but instead they exaggerate their differences with the consensus by an average factor of
2.4. Although exaggeration varies slightly with forecast, firm, and analyst characteristics, in
no subsample of our data do we find evidence of herding. This is perhaps surprising given the
extensive theoretical literature on and popular discussion of herding. 1
The methodology in this paper has two main advantages over most prior empirical work
on herding, which has inferred herding from a lack of forecast/opinion dispersion.2 First,
our methodology allows one to draw conclusions about the absolute amount of herding or
exaggeration relative to unbiased forecasting, whereas inferring herding from forecast dispersion
only allows one to draw relative conclusions about where there is more or less herding. Second,
'The theoretical literature on herding includes information cascade models (Ba.nerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Welch, 1994), incentive-concavity models (Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa, 1986;
Zweibel, 1995; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997, 1999; Laster, Bennett and Geoum, 1999), and career-concerns models
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Brandenburger and Polak, 1996; Trueman, 1994; Ehrbeck and Waldman, 1996;
Prendergast and Stole, 1996; Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2000; Effinger and Polborn,
2000).
2Examples include Lamont (1995), Ellison and Chevalier (1997 and 1999), and Hong, Kubik, and Solomon
(2000). Graham (1999) takes a related approach, inferring more or less herding from more of less updating based
on changes in the consensus.
7
our. n thodology controls for the independent private information content of forecasts. Since
forecasts can be bunched together either due to herding or simply if forecasters have limited
amounts of independent private information, inferring herding from forecast dispersion requires
the assumption that forecast information content is held constant.
This assumption of constant forecast information content is more appropriate in some past
studies than in others. For example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) conclude that fund managers
herd less in the last two months of the year when they are at a convex point in the inflow-
performance relationship from the fact that they hold portfolios that are more different from
the market portfolio. An alternative hypothesis would be that these fund managers suddenly
gained access to move private information in the last two months of the year, but the authors
are probably on safe ground in ignoring this possibility. In contrast, Hong, Kubik, and Solomon
(2000) conclude that less experienced analysts herd more than experienced analysts from the.
fact that they report forecasts that are closer to the consensus. Here, one might want to take
more seriously the possibility that more experienced analysts have more private information.
In fact, when we repeat the analysis of Hong, et. al. using our methodology, we find that less
experienced analysts actually exaggerate more than experienced analysts, but they still report
forecasts that are closer to the consensus since they have much less independent private infor-
mation. So controlling for forecast information content is important in that it can sometimes
change the conclusions of one's analysis.
In addition to finding that analysts overweight their current-period private information, we
also find that they overweight their prior-period private information, or, equivalently, learn
too little from last period's forecast error. In addition to documenting another way in which
analysts over-weight their private information, this finding helps reconcile the apparently in-
consistent over and under-reaction findings of DeBondt and Thaler (1990) and Abarbanell and
Bernhard (1992), respectively. DeBondt and Thaler found that analysts were too optimistic as
a group when they forecast above last period's earnings and interpreted this as overreaction;
Abarbanell and Bernhard found that analysts were too pessimistic when earnings were trend-
ing up and interpreted this as underreaction. In both cases, analysts are underreacting to the
information in last period's actual earnings. What we find is that controlling for the under-
updating by individual analysts (i.e. for the serial correlation in individual analysts' forecast
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errors) eliminates all of the Abarbanell and Bernhard result and two-thirds of the DeBondt and
Thaler result.
A useful by-product of our methodology for measuring exaggeration/herding controlling for
forecast information content is a measure of forecast information content itself. This measure
is useful because it is proportional to what a mean-variance investor should be willing to pay
for early access to an analyst's forecasts. Almost all past studies of analyst performance have
evaluated analysts based on forecasting accuracy.3 While accuracy and forecast information
content are related, using forecast accuracy as a measure of analyst ability has drawbacks
almost perfectly analogous to those of inferring herding from a lack of forecast dispersion.
First, measures of forecast accuracy can not be translated readily into a measure of the value
of the forecast to its consumer, thus they cannot measure analyst ability in absolute terms
that are economically meaningful. Second and more importantly, assuming that more accurate
forecasters are higher ability involves assuming that the accuracy of the public information
available to the analyst is constant, which will almost never be true, particularly when forecasts
are made sequentially.4 To illustrate this point, consider that any analyst could be very accurate
by simply repeating the forecast of the historically most accurate analyst, but that investors
would pay very little for early access to such an analyst's forecasts and they would not make
money trading on the forecasts in an efficient market.
When we evaluate analysts using this new measure of forecast information content, we find
large differences in analyst ability. The analysts ranked in the top 10 percent based on their
historical performance make future forecasts that are roughly six times as valuable as those
made by analysts ranked in the bottom 40 percent. The best predictor of an analyst's future
forecast information content is her past forecast information content, although other variables
such as experience and brokerage size/prestige are correlated with forecast information content.
The remainder of this paper is divided into two sections. The first section describes the
exaggeration measurement methodology and the results for I/B/E/S analysts. The second
3 Studies evaluating analysts using forecast accuracy include O'Brien (1990), Butler and Lang (1991), Stickel
(1992), Lim (1998), Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999).
4Some researchers have recognized this problem and attempted to adjust for forecast timeliness, albeit in an
ad hoc manner (e.g., Cooper, Day, and Lewis, 1999). The incremental forecast information content measure in
this paper avoids the need for such a correction by incorporating the timeliness of a forecast directly into the
measure of its value.
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section describes the forecast information content measure. A conclusion follows.
1.2 Exaggeration by equity analysts
This section presents evidence that equity analysts exaggerate their differences with the consen-
sus by a factor of roughly 2.4. We begin by presenting a methodology for measuring biases in
forecasting in general, and explain how to use this methodology to measuring herding and/or
exaggeration in particular. We then describe the data we use and how we implement the
methodology and present the results.
1.2.1 Methodology
We would like to understand ow a forecaster translates her private information into a poten-
tially biased forecast, especially the relationship between the forecaster's rational expectation
and the forecast she actually reports. This relationship is impossible to examine for any one
observation, since we cannot directly observe expectations. We can, however, draw conclu-
sions about the relationship between expectations and forecasts over multiple observations by
examining the relationship between actual values and forecasts, using the fact that expecta-
tional errors must not be predictable from any information known at the time of expectation
formation.
Formally, we are interested in how analysts convert expectations into forecasts, i.e. in the
function
F = f(E, A, QP)
where F is a forecast of A (for actual earnings) and E = E(AIQA, QP) is the expectation of
A given all the public (QP) and private (A) information known to the analyst at the time
of forecasting. Since we are especially interested in whether analysts herd or exaggerate their
differences with the consensus, we are particularly interested in the function:
F - C = g(E - C, A ,fP ) (1.1)
where C = E(AQ2P) is the consensus before the analyst forecasts, defined as the expectation
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of A given all public information at time of forecasting.
Given a sample of data, we can learn about the relationship between F - C and E - C by
studying the relationship between F - C and A - C. Specifically, we can invert g and write:
A-C = g-l(F-C,QA,qfP)+e. (1.2)
e = A-E
Since the expectational error must be mean-zero with respect to any variable known at time
of forecasting, E(eIlA, fP) = 0, we can study g-1 and thus g using standard parametric or
non-parametric regression techniques.
A simple model of exaggeration
In order to generate some intuition for what economic variables might affect the forecasting
function in (1), consider the following simple model. T analysts forecast a variable A in an
exogenously given sequence. Analyst t observes public information fjP, which includes the t - 1
prior forecasts, and private information QA. We define Ct = E(AIf P) and Et = E(AIP, fQA )
as above.
Assume that analysts face three incentives: an incentive for minimizing forecast mean-
squared error (A), an incentive for optimistically or pessimistically biasing her forecasts (p),
and an incentive for either increasing or decreasing the deviation between her forecast and the
consensus (y). We can think of the incentive for optimism as coming from an attempt to curry
favor with management in order to secure underwriting business or future assess to information
(Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Ackert and Athannanos, 1998; Lin and McNichols, 1998). We
can think of the incentive for increasing or decreasing the deviation with the consensus as
coming from an attempt to signal ability (e.g., Prendergast and Stole, 1996; Chapter 2), or
from incentive convexities (e.g., Zweibel, 1995; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997 and 1999). We can
write the analyst's problem as
max-y(Ft - Ct)2 + ME(Ft - A) - AE(A - Ft)2 (1.3)Ft
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The first-order condition is
Ft -Ct = A (Et - Ct) + 2 (1.4)
b c
We assume that A > 7, i.e. that the incentive for accuracy is large enough to assure an interior
optimum. The analyst multiplies her differences with the consensus by a factor b and adds an
bias c. When y > 0, b > 1 and the analyst exaggerates her differences with the consensus; when
? < 0, b < 1 and the analyst herds.
Estimating average exaggeration
We can estimate the exaggeration factor in (4) across multiple observations using the approach
outlined above in (2) by rewriting it as the regression equation:
(Ai - Cit) = + b- (Fit - Cit) + it (1.5)
eit = Ai-Eit.
where i indexes different values of A being forecast. Notice that by construction the error term
Ai - Eit = Ai - E(Ailfp, QA) is zero in expectation given all information known by the analyst
at time of forecasting, and thus is zero in expectation for all values of Eit - Cit and Fit - Cit.
The slope coefficient from this regression is b- 1, the inverse of the exaggeration factor, so a
coefficient less than one implies exaggeration and one greater than one implies herding.
If our estimation includes multiple forecasts of a given value of Ai, we must take into account
a non-traditional correlation in the error terms. We can rewrite the error term as:
T-1
it= (Ai - EiT) + (Eis+l -Eis). (1.6)
s=t
Each error term is the sum of T - t + 1 uncorrelated (by construction) terms. Given this error
term structure, OLS estimates of (5) will be consistent, but standard errors will be biased.
Keane and Runkle (1998) present a GMM procedure to estimate standard errors when errors
are correlated as in (6). When we follow this procedure, we find that standard errors are very
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similar to standard errors that allow for clustering of errors for forecasts of the same i; the
intuitive reason for this is that the variance of the first term in (6) is very large relative to the
other terms.
1.2.2 Implementation issues
In order to estimate the regression equations in (2) and (5), we need forecast data and a
methodology for measuring Cit; the consensus expectation of Ai prior to an analyst's forecast.
Forecast data
We estimate analyst exaggeration using the I/B/E/S Detail History dataset of analysts' earnings
forecasts.5 The I/B/E/S data is free of survivorship bias and most analysts who make publicly
available earnings forecasts provide their forecasts to I/B/E/S. Since past research has shown
that the predictive power of long-term earnings forecasts is very low (e.g., Crichfield, et. al,
1978), we restrict our sample to quarterly earnings forecasts made up to 6 months prior to
earnings release.
We want to measure how much analysts exaggerate their information relative to the current
consensus; it is therefore important to know the dates and order in which forecasts were made
public with some precision. This has only been possible with I/B/E/S data since roughly 1993.
I/B/E/S dates forecasts using the date it was entered into the I/B/E/S system. It has been
well documented (e.g., by O'Brien, 1988) that the lags between a forecast becoming public and
its entry into the I/B/E/S system were substantial in the 1980s (i.e., up to a month). In the
1980s, analysts mailed their forecasts, often in monthly batches, to I/B/E/S where they were
hand entered into the system. Since 1991-92, however, analysts have entered their forecasts
directly into the I/B/E/S system on the day they wish to make their forecast widely available
5In contrast to some prior studies, we use I/B/E/S actual earnings rather than COMPUSTAT earnings.
Although the basic exaggeration result is not sensitive to this choice, we use I/B/E/S actuals because they are
recorded on same basis that analysts make their forecasts for I/B/E/S. If potential clients use the I/B/E/S data
to evaluate analysts, they are most likely to compare I/B/E/S forecasts with I/B/E/S actuals, and therefore
the I/B/E/S actual is the number the analyst should focus on forecasting with her I/B/E/S forecast. Past
researchers, e.g. Philbrick and Ricks (1991), had noted problems with I/B/E/S actuals and recommended using
Compustat actuals. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000) find that the quality of I/B/E/S actuals has improved
significantly since 1992 and that after 1992 earnings response coefficients are significantly higher when I/B/E/S
forecasts are matched with I/B/E/S rather than Compustat actuals.
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(Kutsoati and Bernhardt, 1999). Current practice for analysts is now usually to publicly release
forecasts within 24 hours of providing them to clients. I/B/E/S analysts have real-time access to
each other's forecasts through this system, so an analyst entering a forecast into the system on
Wednesday knows about forecasts entered on Tuesday and could potentially revise her forecast
to incorporate their information. We tested the claim that the consistency between I/B/E/S and
public release dates has improved dramatically since the 1980s by examining the event returns
accompanying a forecast above or below the consensus. From 1991-93 there was a dramatic
increase in the concentration of the event returns around the I/B/E/S date of the forecast, we
interpret this as evidence in support of the claim that the accuracy of the dates has increased
(Table A3). An additional advantage of the post-92 data is the shift from retrospective data
entry by a specialist to real-time data entry by either the analyst or her employee should have
considerably reduced data-entry-related measurement error.
In addition to limiting the sample to 1993-99, we also eliminate observations with current
share prices of less than $5 or current market capitalizations of less than $100 million (in 1999
CPI-deflated dollars). This restriction eliminated about 7 percent of the potential sample. We
do this primarily because extreme outliers were concentrated among these stocks and using these
sample restrictions removed the need to condition on the independent variables to eliminate
these outliers, i.e. eliminating penny stocks and micro-caps removes enough outliers that the
results are no longer sensitive to the treatment of the remaining outliers. 6 We should note that
these sample inclusion criteria are much more liberal than in many other studies; limiting the
sample to companies covered by at least 10 analysts, a common restriction, eliminates about
40 percent of the potential sample. In order to convince ourselves that the exaggeration result
does not depend on the sample inclusion criteria, we run the exaggeration regression on the
pre-93, penny-stock, and micro-cap observations, and find similar results once we have removed
outliers.
The sample we use contains 836,639 forecasts, 728,325 of which follow at least one forecast
6The companies covered by I/B/E/S analysts with market capitalizations under $100 million tend to be
formerly larger cap companies that have experienced stock price declines. These companies tend to have very
large variances in earnings/price ratios, which increases the heteroskedasticity in sample and makes it difficult
to distinguish data entry errors from true outliers due to a. low market cap in the denominator. Eliminating
penny stocks from the sample also has the advantage of reducing discreteness problems that result from analysts
forecasting and companies reporting earnings as a whole number of pennies per share.
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and thus can have their difference with the consensus measured. These forecasts cover 7,008
firms, and 87,303 firm-quarter combinations. An average of 10 forecasts are made for a given
firm-quarter combination; the median forecast is made for a firm-quarter with 17 other forecasts
made. The sample includes forecasts by 5,688 individual analysts and 490 brokerage firms; each
are identified in the I/B/E/S data by a unique code. There are an average of 155 forecasts
per analyst in the sample, the median forecast is made by an analyst who makes a total of 423
forecasts in the 1993-99. sample. Table A4 reports summary statistics for the major variables
used in the exaggeration analysis.
Measuring the consensus
A practical issue in estimating (5) is measuring Cit, the consensus prior expectation of earnings
given all prior forecasts and public information. Measuring the consensus well is important,
since measurement error would bias the estimated coefficient in (5) toward one, biasing us
toward finding unbiased forecasting. We use three different measures of the consensus that
imply different levels of sophistication on the part of market participants. We find that using
a more sophisticated consensus measure reduces our estimated coefficient slightly, consistent
with reduced omitted variable bias. In section 2.3.3, we find that our results are robust to the
inclusion of several variables that may proxy for any remaining consensus mismeasurement.
The three consensus measures we use are the mean of all outstanding forecasts, the mean
of the three most recent forecasts, and an econometric expectation of earnings. 7 The equal-
weighted mean of all forecasts is an intuitive and popular measure of the consensus. An issue
with this measure is that if information is available to later forecasters or if analysts incorporate
prior forecasts into their estimates, then a properly constructed expectation will put more
weight on later forecasts. Measuring the consensus as the mean of the last three forecasts or
the econometric expectation of earnings addresses this issue in a more and less ad hoc fashion,
respectively.
7The econometric expectation is constructed using the model: A-M = a+3/(Ft- -M)+-y(Ft- 2 -M), where
A is actual earnings, M is the mean of all previous forecasts, and Ft- 1 and Ft-2 are the mean of all forecasts
on the two most recent days on which forecasts were made. We estimate this model allowing for different 
and y depending on the number of forecasts on each of the two days. The results of this regression run for the
entire 1993-99 period are presented in Table Al. To avoid any data-snooping bias in constructing our consensus
measure, we used 1993-96 data to estimate the model used for 1997-99 consensus measures and vice versa.
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Many financial market participants and journalists use the simple average of forecasts as a
consensus measure, while other market participants use ad hoc measures that capture the trend
in forecasts or an econometric prediction of earnings (e.g., I/B/E/S's ESP model). Stock re-
turn evidence suggests that the difference between sophisticated and unsophisticated consensus
measures are only 50 percent reflected in stock prices, implying that users of "unsophisticated"
consensus measures play a role in setting market prices.8 This evidence suggests that we should
be somewhat agnostic about how the market constructs its consensus. We conduct most of our
analysis using the econometric expectation as our consensus measure, but test the sensitivity
of the results to using the mean of all forecasts.
1.2.3 Results
Non-parametric results
Figure 1 presents a non-parametric estimation of the function g-1 in equation (2). The figure
suggests that the relationship between F - C and the expected value of A - C is roughly
linear. There is some evidence of a kink at zero, with more exaggeration for forecasts above the
consensus than for those below, but spline regressions suggest that this kink is not statistically
significant.9 Given this, the rest of the paper will focus on assuming that the relationship is
linear and estimating the determinants of its slope.
Linear exaggeration regression results
Table 1 presents estimations of equation (5). In all regressions, we normalize actual and fore-
cast EPS by the share price and weight observations by their market capitalization to reduce
heteroskedasticity. 10 One other study that we know of has run a version of this regression, and
STable A2 presents this evidence. Zitzewitz (2001b) examines this issue in more detail.
9A specification of (2) allowing for a change of slope at zero finds a slope of 0.574 (0.083) below zero and a
slope change at zero of -0.113 (0.154), standard errors in parentheses. The slope change is insignificant. Results
are insensitive to slight variations in the location of the breakpoint. Excluding the 10 percent of the data with an
estimate-consensus difference greater than half a percent of the share price changes the results to a slope of 0.812
(0.068) below zero and a slope change of -0.460 (0.129); this significant slope change suggests that there may be
asymmetric exaggeration for non-extreme forecasts. This non-linearity is potentially deserving of future study,
however it does not appear overwhelming enough distract us from an analysis based on constant exaggeration.
l°Results from equal-weighted regressions are qualitatively similar but have larger heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. An analysis of the residuals reveals that the variance of the residual increases roughly propor-
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we begin by replicating those results. Keane and Runkle (1998) estimated a version of equation
(5) that did not subtract the consensus from both sides of the equation. They analyzed six
different industries and found that on average, b- l was roughly one. They concluded from this
that analysts forecasts were unbiased on average, and interpreted this finding as a confirmation
of rational expectations. An issue with this result, however, is that if we believe that analysts
have some common prior information, then by not subtracting the consensus from both sides
we are essentially adding a number to both sides of our regression equation whose variance is
large relative to the variance of our dependent and independent variables. This seriously biases
the regression coefficient toward one.
The first two lines of each panel of Table 1 estimate Keane and Runkle's version of (5),
limiting the sample to their six industries. We also find a coefficient of over 0.9 and do not
always reject the hypothesis that b- 1 = 1, i.e. that analysts neither exaggerate or herd. This
estimate is reduced to roughly 0.8 if we expand the sample to include all the industries in
the I/B/E/S sample (Table 1, lines 3 and 4).11 Once we subtract the consensus from both
sides, however, the results change. Lines 5-7 of Table 1 estimate (5) using the three different
measures of the consensus discussed above. As the measure of the consensus becomes more
"sophisticated," the bias due to consensus mismeasurement is reduced and the coefficient moves
further away from one.
In order to further reduce potential consensus mismeasurement problems, lines 8-10 of
Table 1 estimate (5) excluding two types of forecasts for which there is likely to be public
information that is not reflected in the consensus measure: forecasts immediately following the
prior quarter's earnings announcement and forecasts occurring on multi-forecast days (which
usually indicates a news release or earnings warning from the company). This reduces the
estimate of b- 1 to roughly 0.41, which implies b = 2.4, i.e. that analysts exaggerate their
differences with the consensus by a factor of 2.4. Further attempts to control for any remaining
consensus mismeasurement by including variables in the regression that may be correlated with
tionally with market cap, so weighting observations by market-cap is very close to the FGLS estimator.
"lA potential explanation for the reduced coefficient is that the Keane and Runkle industries (airlines, alu-
minium, auto assembly, chemicals, other non-ferrous metals, and railroads) are a.ll industries with publicly
available input costs that affect earnings in fairly well understood ways. Analysts may therefore have more
information to work with for these industries and thus have less need to exaggerate; alternatively, there may be
less earnings uncertainty a.nd thus less opportunity to get away with exaggeration.
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the measurement error (e.g., the stock price change since the last earnings forecast) do not
significantly affect the results (Table A5).12
Cross-sectional variation in exaggeration
In this subsection, we examine how measured exaggeration varies with forecast, firm, and
analyst characteristics by interacting the right-hand side of (5) with these characteristics. In
particular, we estimate the standard interaction specification:
Ai - Cit = SZit + (Zit)(Fi - Ci t) + eit (1.7)
Cit
bit
b-1 =7Zit
where Zit is a vector of forecast, firm, and analyst characteristics that includes a constant (Table
2).
Past exaggeration by an analyst is the best predictor of future exaggeration.'3 Outside
of past exaggeration, b- 1 does not vary much with forecast, firm, and analyst characteristics.
In particular, it does not vary significantly with market capitalization, the number of covering
analysts, the standard deviation of outstanding forecasts, or the time left before earnings release.
Furthermore, when we divide the sample based on the forecast, firm, and analyst characteristics,
the hypothesis of unbiased forecasting (b = 1) can be rejected for almost every subsample of
the data (Table A5).
12We also considered the possibility of measurement error in F, since this measurement error would bias the
estimated coefficient toward zero and thus bias us in favor of finding exaggeration. We limited our sample to
1993-99 in part so that we would be using only data entered by the analyst on a real-time basis, which should
have fewer measurement error problems. We found that our estimated coefficient changed by less than 0.01
when we excluded observations with extreme values of (F - C) in the 1993-99 sample, whereas excluding these
observations made a large difference in the 1984-92 data. We also tested whether the results were affected by
forecast discreteness, i.e. by the fact that analysts usually forecast earnings in whole numbers of pennies per
share. Including only forecasts that differ from the consensus by more than two cents changes our estimate of
b- 1 by less than 0.01, a finding that should not be surprising given the linearity of the non-parametric estimate
in Figure 1.
13This statement is based on two analyses. First, the R2 from an estimation of (2) increases from 0.0099 to
0.0253 when 3 is interacted with the past for the analyst. Interacting with the additional 24 forecast, firm,
and analyst characteristics in Table 2 only increases R 2 to 0.0372. Second, if we predict a , for each observation
based on the coefficients in the interaction regression, the standard deviation of the predicted is 0.22 when past
/3 is the only interaction variable; it increases to only 0.29 when the other 24 interaction variables are added.
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There are some exceptions to this general conclusion that b- 1 does not vary. Sector effects
are significant; analysts' forecasts appear very exaggerated for the health care sector, while the
hypothesis that b- 1 is equal to one cannot be rejected for finance and consumer nondurables,
although the point estimates are still less than one. There are also statistically significantly
differences in exaggeration by year, with less exaggeration in 1995 and 1996 than in other
years. Interactions with analyst career variables also reveal some variations in b- 1. Analysts at
brokerage firms with more I/B/E/S analysts, which also are usually the more prestigious firms,
exaggerate less, and analysts with a longer forecasting experience also exaggerate slightly less.
The conclusion that analysts with longer forecasting experience exaggerate less provides an
opportunity to illustrate the importance of measuring exaggeration or herding using a method-
ology that controls for forecast information content, rather than inferring herding from a lack
of forecast dispersion. In Table 4, we present measures of forecast dispersion and the exaggera-
tion coefficients estimated using equation (5) for analysts with different amounts of forecasting
experience. The measures of absolute forecast dispersion reveal that less experienced analysts
deviate less from the consensus. Hong, et. al. (2000) interpreted this as implying that less ex-
perienced analysts herded more, but the estimates of b- 1 imply that less experienced analysts
actually exaggerate more even though they deviate from the consensus less. The reconcilia-
tion of these two seemingly conflicting results is that less experienced analysts have much less
forecast information content, using the Var[E(ylx)] measure that we will discuss in the next
section.
Relationship of findings to over/under-reaction literature
In part as a potential explanation for stock price momentum results, a literature has developed
investigating whether analysts over or under-react to information. DeBondt and Thaler (1990)
estimate the model
Ait - Ait-1 = (Cit - Ait-1) + it, (1.8)
where Ait and Ai,t_1 are the current and prior-year actual earnings and Cit is the mean of
all earnings forecasts. They find < 1 and interpret this finding as analysts collectively
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overreacting to new information. Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) estimate the model:
Ait - Cit = (Ait-1 - Ait- 2) + Cit (1.9)
using quarterly data, find 3 > 0, and interpret this finding as under-reaction to new information,
since it implies that analysts as a group are too pessimistic when earnings are trending up.
This paper offers a potential resolution of these seemingly conflicting findings. We find
that analysts exaggerate (or overreact to) their own new private information, but they under-
react to new information that suggests that their previous private information was wrong.
Controlling for this effect explains all of the Abarbanell-Bernard under-reaction and almost all
of the DeBondt-Thaler over-reaction. Table 3 estimates the model:
Ait- Cit = a + 3(Fit - Cit) + y(Cit - Ait-) + 6(Ait- - Ait-2) + (Ait - Fit-l) + eit, (1.10)
where Ai,t_ - Fi,t_1 is the individual analyst's forecast error in the last quarter. The first two
lines restate the last regression in Table 1 and reestimate it for the sample for which all the
variables in (9) are non-missing and for which the, forecast was made after last quarter's earnings
were known. The next line replicates DeBondt and Thaler's result, with our -y+1 being equal to
their /3. We are using quarterly rather than annual data, so this suggests that the DeBondt and
Thaler result is present at higher frequencies as well.14 The following line adds the ,(Ft - Ct)
term to the regression, finding that neither coefficient is reduced significantly. The conclusion
from this would be that analysts exaggerate their own information and, in addition, overreact
to (or fail to back out the exaggeration in) other agent's forecasts.
The second panel of Table 3 replicates Abarbanell and Bernard's finding and finds that the
coefficient is reduced only slightly by including ,(Fit -Cit). In the third panel, however, we find
that adding the lagged analyst error term to the model (Ait-1 - Fit-_) reduces the estimate
of y by two thirds and reduces the magnitude and changes the sign of the estimate of 6. The
large and significant estimate for 0 implies that analysts are very stubborn in updating their
14One might worry that the results in this section are an artifact of seasonality in earnings. To check this, we
replicated the results in Table 3 replacing Ct - At-1 with Ct - At- 4 and At- - At- 2 with f= (At - At-s-4)
and found qualitatively the same results.
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beliefs about a company. The reduction in the estimate of 6 suggests that analysts appear to
under-react to trends in earnings because of this stubbornness. The reduction in the estimate of
7 suggests that analysts appear to overreact to new, post-earnings information in part because
they are really under-reacting to the earnings information itself and over-weighting their old
beliefs.
Figures Al and A2 provide a non-parametric analysis of the bivariate relationships between
current-period forecast' error and either prior-period earnings change or prior-period same-
analyst forecast error, respectively. Both graphs show evidence of a kink at zero, suggesting that
analysts under-react more to negative earnings changes and/or are more stubborn about revising
their past beliefs downward. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) test for asymmetric over/under
reaction to past earnings changes (Figure Al) and find evidence of overreaction to positive
earnings changes and under-reaction to negative changes. In our sample, however, we find that
spline regressions find evidence of a statistically significant kink at zero only for same-analyst
forecast error (Figure A2) and then only if the 5 percent most extreme observations in each
direction are excluded.
Interpretation of results
Taken together, the results in Tables 1 and 3 suggest that analysts are simultaneously behaving
like the young and old agents in Prendergast and Stole (1996). The young agents in Prendergast
and Stole exaggerate their differences with the consensus to signal ability; the older agents under
update their old forecasts to avoid signalling a lack of ability in the past. Our evidence suggests
that analysts exaggerate their private information in the current period while also exaggerating,
or under-updating, their old private information.
There are at least two potential explanations for the observed exaggeration and under-
updating. Analysts could be exaggerating and under-updating in order to mimic higher-ability
analysts. Current-period exaggeration could also be the result of analysts attempting to ei-
ther stimulate trading volume for their employers or to produce higher event returns for their
priviledged clients. Alternatively, both current-period exaggeration and under-updating could
be the result of analysts overweighting both their current-period and prior-period private in-
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formation because they are overly confident in its precision.l 5 Conscious exaggeration for
career-concerns or other incentive-related reasons is very difficult to distinguish from uncon-
scious exaggeration due to overconfidence. Although we believe that this section provides fairly
strong evidence of exaggeration, we do not claim to be able to determine whether the exagger-
ation is conscious or not.
1.3 Forecast information content
A useful byproduct of the methodology for measuring exaggeration is a measure of forecast
information content that under some assumptions can be interpreted as a measure of a forecast's
economic value to its users. Clients of I/B/E/S analysts are typically investors who pay for early
access to their earnings forecasts and other opinions; usually the "payment" involves directing
transactions to the analyst's brokerage. The value of early access to a forecast to an investor is
the profit they can make from adjusting their portfolio before the forecast becomes public.
1.3.1 Measuring forecast information content
For notional convenience, define y = A-C = A-E(AI( P ) and x = F-C. Assume that security
returns are linear in y and that the event returns when a forecast is released are proportional to
E(ylx) and have a fixed and known variance. A mean-variance investor facing zero transactions
costs with access to x before it becomes public information will make investments proportional
to the expected event returns, thus the expected value of early access to x for such an investor
will be proportional to E[E(ylx) 2] = Var[E(ylx)]. If the relationship between E(ylx) and x
is linear, as the results in the prior section suggest, then E(ylx) = Ox and the expected value
of a forecast is equal to E[(fix) 2 ] = f 2 Var(x). This measure, if estimated at the analyst level
using historical data, is exaggeration-proof: exaggerating by an additional factor of 2 will raise
Var(x) by a factor of 4 but lower by a factor of 2, leaving ,32 Var(x) unchanged.
15A final possibility is that analysts are neither consciously overweighting their information nor overconfident,
but rather the have been surprised in the entire 1984-99 period (we find exaggeration to roughly the same degree
in the pre-93 data once outliers are removed) by actual earnings failing to reflect their private signals as fully as
they anticipated. We believe this to be unlikely, but cannot rule it out as a possibility.
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1.3.2 Relationship between forecast value and information content in non-
financial environments
In a financial market environment, it is natural to assume that information is used to make
investments in relatively liquid assets and thus that information is valuable only if it is not
known by other market participants and thus not already reflected in asset prices. In a non-
financial market environment, it might be more natural to think of the value of information
as being related to the improvement in the accuracy of understanding of the variable being
forecast. In this section we show that under some circumstances, this improvement in accuracy
will also be equal to Var[E(ylx)], the measure motivated in a financial context above.
The formal relationship between accuracy and information content is between the level of
information content and the improvement a forecast makes to the accuracy of one's beliefs.
This improvement in accuracy of beliefs can be decomposed into three components:
E[(A - )2]- E[(A - F)2] = E[(C -C) 2] E[(E - C)2] - E[(F -E) 2] (1.11)
Reduction Noise in Information Translation
in MSE consensus content cost
where A is actual earnings, C is the prior consensus, C is the potentially noisy version of the
consensus observed by the client, E is the clients' rational expectation of earnings given the
forecast, and F is the clients' actual expectation of earnings. 16 Notice that E[(E - C)2 ] is the
same as the Var[E(ylx)] measure in the section above.
If clients are fully able to translate forecasts into expectations, then F = E and the last
term is zero; if clients are completely unable to translate forecasts, then F will be the analyst's
forecast and (F - E)2 will increase as the analyst herds or exaggerates. If clients observe the
consensus without noise and if they can perfectly translate forecasts into unbiased expectations,
(9) implies that the improvement in accuracy is exactly the information content of the forecast.
If clients' understanding of the consensus is noisy, however, then the (C- C)2 term will be
16To derive equation (9), note that it can be rewritten as the expectation of: 2(F-C)(A-E) = 2(A-C)(C-C).
Both sides of this expression are zero in expectation, since, by construction, A -Eis uncorrelated with all variables
known at the time the expectation is formed, including F - C, and the noise in the noisy consensus measure
C - C should not be correlated with A - C.
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positive, since simply restating the consensus provides some value. And if clients are unwilling
or unable to translate forecasts into unbiased expectations, then exaggerating or herding can
reduce the value of a forecast.
This suggests that when clients are aware of the consensus and able to translate forecasts
into rational expectations, then the forecast information content fully captures a forecast's value
even in a non-financial context. When these conditions do not hold, absolute forecast accuracy
can be a useful additional measure. We believe that the former situation better describes the
environment in which equity analysts operate, and therefore use information content as our
primary measure of forecast value.
1.3.3 Differences in information content across analysts
In this section, we examine whether the past forecasting record of an analyst is informative
about the future information content of their forecasts. To do this, we rank analysts according
to our Var[E(ylx)] = ,2Var(x) measure of forecast value and then compare the value of future
forecasts made by analysts with different past performances. Treating 2Var(x) as a measure of
forecast value that we can aggregate across observations involves assuming that prior knowledge
of a given change in earnings expectations as a percent of market-cap has equal value across
observations. In practice, this involves assuming that earnings-response coefficients (ERCs) and
depth are equal across firms. While this is probably not the case, measuring ERCs and depth
is notoriously difficult. Instead of incorporating a noisy measure of depth and the ERC into
our measure of forecast information content, we will instead control in our analysis for firm
characteristics likely to affect depth or the ERC.
In calculating the 132Var(x) measure, we require a minimum of 50 observations. This cutoff
is arbitrary; the general idea is to avoid having a large and heterogeneous amount of noise in
the 32 Var(x) measure. We experimented with and found similar results for cutoffs of 25, 100,
200, and 500 forecasts. Only half of the 5,688 analysts in the sample made 50 or more forecasts
in the 1993-99 period, but these analysts accounted for over 95 percent of all forecasts and
over 80 percent of forecasts were made by analysts who had already made 50 or more forecasts.
In all the analyses of forecasting performance that follow we exclude the first forecast after
an earnings announcement and forecasts on multi-forecast days since these forecasts appear to
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incorporate a significant amount of public information that is not captured in our consensus
measure. These two restrictions reduce the sample to 299,747 observations from the original
728,325.
Table 5 divides analysts into ten deciles according to their , 2Var(x) and estimates the ,,
Var(x), and ,2Var(x) of their next forecast. Analysts are reranked after every forecast so the
same analyst could appear in different deciles at different times. The deciles are constructed
in two ways: by ranking all analysts together and by ranking analysts within their sector
of expertise. 7 The results suggest that analysts in the top decile have forecast information
contents roughly 5-6 times that of the bottom 40 percent. Top-decile analysts not only report
forecasts that are twice as far from the consensus as those of the bottom analysts but they also
exaggerate by slightly less in the process. This is possible only if the top-decile analysts have
much more differential information than bottom ones.18
Table 6 tests the statistical significance and robustness of this finding of persistence in
information content. The first panel presents regressions that predict the ln[p2 Var(x)] of an
analyst's next 50 forecasts (or fewer if less than 50 are made before the sample period ends)
based on her historical estimated ln[,32 Var(x)]. We find a positive coefficient that remains
significant and of roughly the same magnitude regardless of the definition of the consensus used
or whether the forecast, firm, and analyst characteristics in Table 2 are controlled for.
The second panel decomposes the historical log forecast value into ln(3) and ln[SD(x)]
and predicts future forecast value using these two variables. We find a significantly larger
coefficient for ln[SD(x)] than for Ln(13). The implication of this is that an analyst can raise the
econometric prediction of her future forecast value by exaggerating, since exaggerating raises
ln[SD(x)] and lowers Ln(3) by equal amounts.
To determine the source of this difference, in the third and fourth panels we decompose
the future Ln[,32 Var(x)J into its additive components Ln(3) and Ln[SD(x)]. We find that
past exaggeration predicts future exaggeration and past deviation from the consensus predicts
'
7 Eighty-five percent of forecasts are in the analyst's sector of specialization. Results are similar if deciles are
formed using only forecasts made in an analyst's sector of specialization.
'The point estimates of 3 in Table 5 are highest for intermediate levels of ability, which is suggestive of the
"middle-status conformity" discussed by Phillips and Zuckerman (1999). Neither the concavity nor the slight
upward slope in the relationship between , and past information content is statistically significant, however. We
should also note that the Phillips and Zuckerman model is a.bout status rather than ability.
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future deviation from the consensus, but that the two variables do not predict each other. The
own lag coefficient is much lower for Ln(8) than for Ln[SD(x)]. One interpretation of this
result is that the large variance in earnings realizations makes estimates of much more noisy
than estimates of SD(x). This difference in coefficients implies than an analyst could raise
her a linear econometric expectation of her future forecast information content to infinity by
exaggerating infinitely, although if analysts face any incentive for absolute accuracy they will
not choose to exaggerate infinitely. This does suggest, however, that if potential clients of an
analyst attempt to determine the future value of her forecasts using her forecasting track record
and if their methodology approximates that of the regression in Table 6, then an analyst could
raise estimates of her ability by exaggerating. This issue is examined in more detail in Chapter
2.
1.3.4 Evidence that information content matters
Section 3.1 argues that an analyst's clients should care about the new information content
in forecasts, rather than about their accuracy, but is there any evidence that they do? We
examine this issue by looking at the characteristics of the prior and subsequent forecasts of
analysts according to their ranking in the 1996 Institutional Investor poll, a survey in which
institutional investors rank analysts according to a subjective assessment of their overall value
(Table 7). We find that first-team analysts have 4-6 times as much information in both their
prior and subsequent forecasts. In contrast, the prior forecasts of first-team analysts are actually
less accurate (i.e., have higher mean-squared error) than those of lower or unranked analysts.
Ranked analysts do perform slightly better in terms of relative forecast accuracy, suggesting that
one reason for their lower forecast accuracy is that they forecast firms with harder to predict
earnings.l9 Probit regressions predicting first-team membership based on 1993-95 performance
find a significant predictive role for both forecast information content and relative forecast
accuracy (Table A7).
19The measure of relative forecast accuracy used is the same measure as in Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000),
i.e. the analyst's average accuracy ranking for each firm-quarter they forecast, where the accuracy rankings are
scaled 0 to 1.
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1.4 Conclusion
This paper presents a new methodology for measuring herding or exaggeration across a group
of forecasts. When we apply the methodology to equity analysts, we find that they exaggerate
their differences with the consensus by a factor of 2.4. This result of exaggeration, or anti-
herding, is robust to different specifications and is present in nearly all subsamples of the data.
Exaggeration does not vary significantly with forecast, firm, and analyst characteristics, but it is
predicted by an analyst's past exaggeration. In addition to finding evidence of exaggeration, we
also find evidence that analysts under-update based on last period's forecasting error; control-
ling for this under-updating and the resulting serial correlation in analyst's forecasting errors
helps explain the apparently conflicting results of DeBondt and Thaler (1990) and Abarbanell
and Bernhard (1992). The methodology for measuring exaggeration in this paper controls for
forecast information content, which is important, since failing to do so can change the conclu-
sions of certain analyses, e.g., the analysis of whether exaggeration increases or decreases with
forecasting experience.
A useful byproduct of the methodology for measuring exaggeration is a measure of the
information content of an analyst's forecasts that is economically meaningful in that it is pro-
portional to what an investor should be willing to pay for early access to a forecast. Using this
measure we find that analysts differ greatly in the information content of their forecast; the
information content of the future forecasts of the top 10 percent of analysts is roughly 5-6 times
that of the bottom 40 percent.
The issues examined in this paper potentially apply to opinion-producing agents other than
equity analysts. A large number of agents produce opinions that can be thought of as forecasts
of random variables; example include macroeconomic or weather forecasters, wine or movie
critics, strategic planners, and management consultants. These agents may exaggerate for
overconfidence or career concerns reasons like the equity analysts studied in this paper, or they
may understate their differences with the consensus as predicted by the herding literature. A
better theoretical and empirical understanding of when and why to expect exaggeration or
herding would be helpful both to consumers of opinions and to organizations that wish to elict
unbiased reports.
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Table 1. Regressions testing for herding or exaggerating of forecasts
This table estimates average herding across multiple forecasts by regressing (ACT - CONS)
on (FOR - CONS); equation (2) in the text. A regression coefficient of one implies unbiased
forecasting, a coefficient greater than one implies herding, and a coefficient less than one
implies anti-herding or exaggeration of differences. To show the sources of differences with
Keane and Runkle (1998), we first estimate results using their specification and sample
definition and our data, expand the sample to our sample definition, and then change to our
specification.
Dep. Variable Indep. Variable Sample Obs. Coeff. S.E.
ACT FOR A 15,911 0.92 0.026
ACT FOR B 49,175' 0.90 0.026
ACT FOR C 836,639 0.81 0.034
ACT FOR D 728,325 0.82 0.034
ACT- MEAN FOR - MEAN D 728,325 0.67 0.051
ACT - LAST3 FOR - LAST3 D 728,325 0.54 0.037
ACT- CONS FOR - CONS D 728,325 0.55 0.043
ACT - MEAN FOR - MEAN E 455,710 0.50 0.052
ACT - LAST3 FOR - LAST3 E 455,710 0.42 0.029
ACT - CONS FOR - CONS E 455,710 0.41 0.037
Variable definitions
ACT
FOR
MEAN
LAST3
CONS
(All earnings variables are divided by the share price)
Actual I/B/E/S earnings per share
Forecast of earnings per share
Mean of all previously outstanding estimates
Mean of last 3 estimates (or fewer if fewer available)
Expected earnings, from model in Table Al
Sample defintions
A Keane and Runkle (1998) industries (airlines, railroads, auto assembly, chemicals,
aluminium, and other non-ferrous metals), 20 largest firms
B Keane and Runkle (1998) industries, all firms
C All industries
D All industries, forecasts with one or more prior forecasts
E All industries, one or more prior forecasts, excluding first forecast after earnings
announcements and forecasts on multi-forecast days
Notes:
1. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering within firms-
quarter combinations. Standard errors for the specification including the
econometrically estimated CONS are adjusted for the inclusion of a predicted value
on the right-hand side.
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Table A5. Exggeration and information content for subsamples
This table estimates exaggeration, deviation from the consensus, and forecast information content
for subsamples of the dataset. The beta is from a regression of y=(ACT - CONS) on x=(FOR -
CONS), the specification in Table 1 and discussed in Section 2.2. The measure of information
content, VarE(ylx)], is described in Section 3.
Beta
Obs. Coeff. S.E. SD(x) Var[E(ylx)]
Forecast characteristics
Number of estimates that day
1 508,134 0.44 0.05 0.63 0.12
2 113,964 0.54 0.21 0.72 0.21
3+ 111,224 0.59 0.16 0.73 0.25
First forecast after last quarter's earning announcement
No 635,229 0.44 0.07 0.65 0.13
Yes 98,093 0.73 0.10 0.68 0.36
Business days since last forecast
1 179,592 0.45 0.11 0.53 0.11
2 72,915 0,30 0.13 0.56 0.05
3-4 94,930 0.48 0.11 0.59 0.14
5-9 134,278 0.44 0.09 0.62 0.12
10-19 121,374 0.42 0.19 0.77 0.13
20+ 122,338 0.61 0.09 0.84 0.31
Revised forecast?
No 344,369 0.57 0.09 0.71 0.23
Yes 388,953 0.40 0.08 0.60 0.10
Analyst career-related variables
Number of analysts at brokerage firm
Under 10 51,732 0.41 0.12 0.61 0.10
10-24 149,052 0.38 0.06 0.56 0.08
25-49 162,490 0.44 0.13 0.66 0.12
50-79 182,675 0.65 0.10 0.66 0.28
80+ 177,712 0.44 0.11 0.72 0.14
Number of forecasts in analyst's career
Under 10 31,103 0.50 0.07 0.73 0.19
10-49 105,363 0.41 0.11 0.68 0.11
50-99 98,352 0.40 0.09 0.71 0.11
100-199 143,886 0.36 0.09 0.65 0.08
200-499 227,972 0.60 0.12 0.64 0.23
500+ 126,646 0.56 0.12 0.62 0.19
Number of forecasts made by analyst in current year
Under 20 35,315 0.38 0.07 0.90 0.13
20-49 108,036 0.37 0.11 0.70 0.10
50-99 257,591 0.53 0.08 0.65 0.18
100-199 258,229 0.45 0.12 0.61 0.13
200+ 69,801 0.73 0.18 0.64 0.34
Years since first forecast by analyst
0 142,894 0.42 0.10 0.68 0.12
1 150,341 0.62 0.15 0.69 0.26
2 126,299 0.42 0.09 0.60 0.11
3 103,537 0.57 0.12 0.66 0.21
4 85,152 0.43 0.13 0.62 0.12
5+ 125,099 0.41 0.14 0.67 0.11
39
Table A5 (cont.) Exggeration and information content for subsamples
Beta
Obs. Coeff. S.E. SD(x) Var[E(ylx)]
Firm characteristics
Market capitalization (1999$)
$100m-$499m 162,050 0.50 0.09 1.06 0.27
$500m-$1.9b 220,325 0.41 0.14 0.67 0.12
$2b-$4.9b 143,938- 0.51 0.07 0.39 0.10
$5b-$20b 137,938 0.56 0.04 0.28 0.09
Over $20b 69,071 0.55 0.05 0.19 0.06
SD(forecast)-to-price ratio
Under 0.0001 472,470 0.72 0.06 0.30 0.16
0.0001 to 0.001 141,253 0.46 0.15 0.71 0.15
0.001 to 0.01 32,774 0.51 0.09 1.51 0.39
Over 0.01 86,825 0.42 0.12 1.20 0.21
Number of analysts covering stock
Under 5 114,521 0.48 0.12 0.86 0.20
5-9 232,537 0.54 0.12 0.72 0.21
10-19 280,231 0.44 0.10 0.58 0.11
20+ 106,033 0.37 0.33 0.40 0.05
Other control variables
S&P industry sector
Finance 90,877 0.93 0.21 0.62 0.53
Health Care 72,829 -0.02 0.25 0.64 0.00
Consumer nondurables 40,223 0.89 0.11 0.72 0.57
Consumer services 121,152 0.46 0.06 0.60 0.13
Consumer durables 26,163 0.73 0.14 0.51 0.27
Energy 62,302 0.32 0.16 0.50 0.05
Transportation 20,201 0.61 0.10 1.31 0.49
Technology 132,487 0.44 0.18 0.65 0.13
Basic materials 72,300 0.40 0.15 0.67 0.11
Capital equipment 49,436 0.47 0.30 0.47 0.10
Utilities 40,871 0.38 0.10 0.76 0.11
Calendar year of quarter
1993 67,544 0.38 0.20 0.59 0.08
1994 87,735 0.59 0.19 0.78 0.27
1995 97,062 0.82 0.10 0.58 0.39
1996 101,402 0.68 0.12 0.54 0.25
1997 111,051 0.33 0.10 0.65 0.07
1998 130,459 0.32 0.12 0.71 0.07
1999 138,069 0.46 0.19 0.69 0.15
40
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Chapter 2
Opinion-producing agents: career
concerns and exaggeration
Summary 2 Chapter 2 examines whether career concerns can create an incentive for opinion-
producing agents to exaggerate. We find that they can create, the reason being that high-ability
agents have opinions that are more different from the consensus on average and potential clients
will learn more quickly about how different an agent's opinions are from the consensus on
average that about whether or not they are exaggerating. The model predicts that agents should
exaggerate more when they are under-rated by their clients, when the realizations of the variables
they are forecasting are expected to be especially noisy, and when they expect to make fewer
future forecasts. We find that these predictions are consistent with the empirical data on equity
analyst's earnings forecasts.
2.1 Introduction
Much of the information in the so-called information economy is not verifyable information as
economists normally define it, but is rather opinion. Opinion goods such as forecasts, consulting
advice, and product reviews are sold in markets, and the production of these and other types
of opinions is also the primary job of many professionals within organizations. Unlike most
traditional goods, the quality of information or opinion goods cannot be readily observed prior
43
to purchase. In addition, opinions that are not verifiable can be manipulated by their producer.
Reputational or career concerns are thus likely to be especially important to opinion producers.
This paper examines the relationship between the reputational or career concerns of opinion
producers and their incentives to engage in a particular type of opinion manipulation, namely
exaggerating their differences with the existing consensus. It essentially asks the question: do
people exaggerate in order to appear smart? Most opinions can be thought of as forecasts of a
random variable that will be realized in the future. We develop a model in which potential clients
attempt to learn the ability of forecasters from their track record. In the model, an incentive to
exaggerate arises because high-ability agents have access to more private information and thus
have unbiased beliefs that are more different from the prior consensus on average. Clients learn
more quickly about how different an agent's forecasts are from the consensus on average than
about whether or not they are exaggerating, and thus agents can temporarily raise estimates
of their ability by exaggerating.
The model also yields cross-sectional predictions about when we should expect agents to
exaggerate more. This is potentially useful to consumers of opinions, since they will want to back
out expected exaggeration to form unbiased beliefs. One source of variation arises from the fact
that the difference in learning speed discussed above is more pronounced when forecast variable
realizations are noisier, so agents should exaggerate more under these circumstances. Likewise,
agents expecting a shorter future career length should exaggerate more. Agents should also
exaggerate more when they have had bad luck in the past and are under-rated by the market
in order to increase the weighting on future observations of their ability. We find that both
the general finding of exaggeration and these cross-sectional predictions are consistent with the
empirical evidence when we examine the exaggeration of equity analysts forecasting earnings
using the methodology developed in Chapter 1.
The model of career concerns and exaggeration in this paper draws on the literature on
career concerns, reputational concerns for producers of goods of unobservable quality, and
herding theory.' It is particularly related to two recent papers. In Prendergast and Stole
'For general career concerns theory see Fama (1980), Holmstrom (1982), and Gibbons and Murphy (1992).
The industrial organizations literature on reputational concerns includes Nelson (1974), Schma.lensee (1978),
Klein and Leffler (1981), and Shapiro (1983). Herding models include information cascade models (Banerjee,
1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Welch, 1999), incentive-concavity models (Holmstrom and
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(1996), "impetuous youngsters" take more extreme actions in order to signal that they have
access to better private information. In Avery and Chevalier (1999), more experienced agents
are expected to have developed private information about their ability and an equilibrium exists
where agents of all abilities always disagree with prior forecasts to signal ability. Relative to
Prendergast and Stole, a contribution of this paper is to examine an environment in which
there is learning from forecast variable realizations. This seemingly trival extension yields the
cross-sectional predictions about the degree of exaggeration that we can test empirically.
The remainder of the paper is organized into two sections. The first develops the model
and the cross-sectional predictions. The second section presents evidence that equity analyst's
earnings forecasts are consistent with these predictions. A conclusion follows.
2.2 Career-concerns model
In this section, we model the incentives created by the career concerns of an agent who forecasts
a series of random variables. We first present a two-period model in which agents issue forecasts
in the first period and receive revenue in the second period proportional to clients' valuation
of their forecasts based on their first period performance. We then extend the model to three
periods in order to examine how past forecasting performance affects an agent's incentives to
exaggerate. From the two-period model we conclude that agents have an incentive to exaggerate
and this incentive to exaggerate will be greater when earnings realizations are expected to be
noisy or when agents expect to make a limited number of forecasts in the future. From the
three-period model, we conclude that agents will also exaggerate more when they have had bad
luck in the past and thus are underrated by their clients.
2.2.1 Two-period model
The model has two periods. In the first period, the agent issues forecasts of J random variables
after observing a private signal and a common prior. In the second period, the agent sells early
Ricart i Costa, 1986; Zweibel, 1995; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997 and 1999; Laster, Bennett and Geoum, 1999), and
career-concerns models (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Brandenburger and Polak, 1996; Trueman, 1994; Ehrbeck
and Waldman, 1996; Prendergast and Stole, 1996; Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2000;
Effinger and Polborn, 2000).
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access to their forecasts to clients, receiving revenue proportional to clients' valuation of their
forecasts based on their first-period performance. Agents also face an exogenous incentive for
forecast accuracy, and thus receive revenue proportional to vA- A MSE, where v is the estimate
of the value of new information in the agents forecasts and A is the size of the incentive for
accuracy. The role of the incentive for accuracy is to make the language analysts use relevant; we
can think of this incentive as the result of clients' costs of translating exaggerated forecasts into
unbiased expectations or industry institutions that measure analysts based on mean squared
error.
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. Nature chooses an ability, a, and an accuracy incentive, A, for the agent from a prior
distribution g(a, A). Both parameters are observed by the agent but are unknown to their
potential customers.
2. The agent forecasts a series of J random variables Aj. For each Aj, the agent observes a
public consensus prior that Aj is distributed N(Cj, E-l), where E is the precision of the
prior. Since Cj is public, we can think of the agent as forecasting yj = Aj - Cj, i.e. the
difference between the actual realization and its consensus prior expectation.
3. In addition, the agent observes an independent private signal sj N(Aj,p-l), where
p = (a > 0 is the precision of the signal. p is an increasing function of a; higher
ability agents receive higher precision private signals.
4. Based on the consensus priors and her private signals, the agent issues forecasts using a
forecasting rule x = x(s, C,p, A), where xj = Fj -Cj is a forecast of yj. All forecasts are
made before any of the earnings variables are realized.
5. Clients with early access to forecasts can make investments in securities with returns that
are proportional to yj.
6. Clients observe the forecasts x and realizations y and estimate the value of the information
content of the agent's forecasts using a valuation rule i5 = v(x, y, .).
7. Agents sell early access to their second-period forecasts and receive revenue proportional
to i - A 1-MSE. Agents consume and experience linear utility.
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Forecast information content and clients valuation of forecasts
After the agent observes the consensus prior and the private signal, her optimal posterior
expectation of yj is
E(yjlCj, sj) = (sj - Cj) p+ (2.1)
where a higher-precision private signal receives a higher weight. Notice that the variance of the
difference between an agent's unbiased beliefs and the prior consensus is increasing in p:
Var[E(yjlsj, Cj)]= ( P = a. (2.2)
Higher-ability agents have opinions that are more different from the consensus, on average. We
will also refer to this variance as the information content of an agent's forecasts, since it is equal
to the reduction in mean-squared error in the expection of yj or Aj due to the agent's private
information:
Var[E(yjlsj, Cj)] = Var(yjlCj) - Var[yj - E(yj sj, Cj)].2 (2.3)
A mean-variance client with early access to a forecast investing in a security with returns
that are linear in yj will invest to maximize
2max Ij E(yj x) - I2 . · Var(yjIxj), (2.4)
where Ij is the client's exposure to yj and r is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The
optimal investment is:
- E(yj Ixj) (2.5)
r. Var(yjlxj)
and such an investment has an ex-ante certainty-equivalent value of
CE = 2 [EV(jlj)) (2.6)2r.- Var(yj xj)'
The value of early access to an agent's forecasts will be proportional to the variance of
E(yjlxj). If an agent's forecasts are fully revealing of her signal, this will be the same as
2 This is true since by the law of iterated expectations, yj - E(yjlsj,Cj) must be uncorrelated with
E(yj lsj, C) - E(yj I Cj)
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Var[E(yj Isj, Cj)] = a, otherwise it will be a less a discount for uncertainty regarding an agent's
forecasting strategy. For simplicity, we will assume that the information lost in communicating
the signal is small in the long run and thus that clients are interested in estimating a as the
long-run value of a client's forecasts, so v = .3
Solution
We will look for a consistent-exaggeration forecasting equilibrium in which agents use the fore-
casting rule: xj = b(a, A) E(yjlsj,Cj,) with some constant exaggeration factor b that can
depend on a or A. This forecasting rule implies that agents exaggerate their differences with
the consensus when b > 1, herd when b < 1, and report their expectation when b = 1.
The standard solution approach would be to solve for a Bayesian equilibrium in which
the analyst chooses her forecasts to maximize expected utility, given the clients' valuation
rule, and the valuation rule produces an unbiased and efficient estimate, given the analyst's
forecasting rule. Unfortunately, the standard Bayesian estimate of v(x, y) = E[alx, y, g(), b()]
is very intractable and conjugate prior distribution families that improve tractability do no exist.
Instead of assuming that clients' make a such a difficult calculation, we will instead assume that
they use an econometric estimation approach that is consistent but not necessarily efficient, with
the inefficiency coming from the incorporation of the information from the prior distribution.
in an approximate rather than a fully Bayesian way. We will describe an equlibrium in which
clients do econometric estimation that anticipates consistent exaggeration and then show that
consistent exaggeration is in fact. optimal for the analysts. 4 This exercise can be viewed as the
derivation of an Bayesian equilibrium in which clients are constrained by bounded rationality
and thus use an unbiased and tractable but less efficient estimation approach. Alternatively,
it can be viewed as merely an analysis of the incentives created for analysts if clients estimate
3If we relaxed this assumption, agents would face an additional incentive for limiting the uncertainty regarding
their exaggeration strategy, since uncertainty about exaggeration creates a. gap between a = Var[E(yjlsj, C)]
and v = Var[E(yj Jxj)]. Relative to the solution described below, the agent would choose an exaggeration factor
slightly closer to their clients' prior expectation of exaggeration.
4Actually, a. consistent-exaggeration equilibrium will be the only equilibrium whenever A > 0. To see this
consider an alternative equilbrium where clients expect an analyst to exaggerate by b f(j), where f varies
predictably from observation to observation. In this case, the first-order condition in (12) below will be b =
[E(CL) + f-l]1[E(CL) 2 - y + A]-', so the analyst will choose a. lower b when f is high and vice versa, i.e.
will choose a strategy closer to consistent exaggeration than they are expected to. It follows that a. consistent
exaggeration is the only equilibrium.
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their ability using a particular econometric procedure.
We proceed by specifying the clients' estimator of analyst ability, solving the analyst's
problem given the clients' valuation rule, and verifying that consistent-exaggeration forecasting
is an equilibrium.
Clients' problem If analysts follow the consistent-exaggeration forecasting rule described
above, they will issue forecasts such that:
E(yjlsj, Cj) = P - Cj) N(O, a)
xi= b P (sj-Cj) N(O, b2a)
yj= b-lxj + j
j = yj-E(yjsj,Cj).
As a result, x; and yj are distributed joint normally:
y ] (, [a +V+( + p)-l ba
X3 J ' N(O, ba b2a
Note that a is the information content of the analyst's forecasts Var[E(yjxj)]; clients are
therefore trying to estimate a.
Given the regression-like setup, it will be convenient to discuss = b- 1 as the change in the
expectation of y for a given change in x. A natural set of estimators for 3 = b-1 and a are the
classical statistical estimators that are used to estimate exaggeration and forecast information
content in Chapter 1:
ACL j1Ej= jyjJ=xCL = J i (2.7)CL- J = Ji22
cj=l 
aCL = cL (var(xj) = (2.8)CL(Xi( - 1) J J2'
These estimators are consistent and unbiased, but they are inefficient if clients have prior
information about a or b(a,A). A client can improve the efficiency of an estimate of a by
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averaging the observed aCL with the mean of her prior distribution. In addition, since the
estimate fICL is likely to be noisier than the estimate Var(xj), especially when V is high,
clients can improve on the efficiency of their estimate by constructing their a with an average
of the observed 3CL and /0, client's prior expectation of b- 1 given the distribution g(a, A) and
the function b(a, A). We therefore assume that clients estimate analysts' ability as:
ap (CL + 'L Y ' 02) ' Var(xj)+ ao (2.9)
where is the weight given the prior expectation of ability and y > 0 is the weight placed on
0o0
The y term in (9) captures an important feature of any optimal estimator, namely that
prior information about exaggeration should be relied on when estimates of exaggeration are
noisy. Equation (9) is similar in structure to a maximum-likelihood estimator of ability; an
analysis of the maximum likelihood estimator in Appendix A yields some intuitive predictions
about the determinants of y. The weight y placed on do should be higher when the estimate
,3 is noisier i.e. when earnings realizations are noisier (and V is higher) or when the number of
observations J is low.5
Analyst's problem Analysts choose their xj to maximize their expectation of ap - A. MSE,
their clients' estimation of their forecast value plus their incentive for absolute accuracy. If
clients use the estimation approach outlined above, the analyst's problem is:
d 2 E J
maxE[ AE[ 2ij21, ~j 1 -  E[Z3]Y (2.10)xaE[ (J 1 *' ) J B x 1' (J - 1) ]'(21
5We can also think of y as capturing the potential for exaggeration to signal high or low ability. When the
distribution g(a, A) and the function b(a, A) are such that the priors on a and b(a, A) are positively (negatively)
correlated, then exaggeration signals low (high) ability. Clients can account for this in their estimation by
lowering (raising) y relative to its value when the priors on a and b(a, A) are uncorrelated.
50
r
where the expectations are the analyst's before y is realized. The first-order condition for each
xj is:6
E(yjiCL) + E(yj) A E(/3CL) + x - - = E(yj) (2.11)
E(3CL) - 2 + A E(3CL)2 -Y/3 + A
So a consistent-exaggeration strategy of the type assumed above is in fact optimal. The analyst
chooses b such that:
P=b-_ E(3cL)2 -' I+= (2.12)
CL + A
From (7) above we can see that rational expectations on the part of the analyst imply
that E(3CL) = 3. This condition together with (8) implies the following relationships between
accuracy incentives (), the weight placed on p0 (), and exaggeration ():
* When = 0 (no prior information about /3) and A = 0 (no incentive for accuracy), any
value of 3 is possible. This is a cheap talk result: if there is no incentive for absolute
accuracy, any language is as good as the next so long as the clients do not have prior
beliefs about /3.
* When y = 0 and A > 0, 3 = 1. Adding even a small incentive for absolute accuracy to
the cheap talk situation makes unbiased forecasting optimal.
* When > 0 and A < y302, = 0 and agents exaggerate by an infinite factor. With
no or a limited incentive for absolute accuracy and with clients placing some weight on
their prior belief, analysts can always increase estimates of their ability by exaggerating
more. Analysts essentially report a binary forecast (i.e., above or below the consensus)
and cannot credibly communicate the strength of their beliefs.7
* When y > 0 and > -y/3o, / = A-'(A- y/3) < 1. Some exaggeration occurs, but it
is limited to a finite amount by the incentive for absolute accuracy. As this incentive
increases, the amount of exaggeration decreases. Likewise, as J decreases or random
variable realizations become noisier and thus clients rely more on their prior beliefs about
6Although it might appear that this simplification was made using the incorrect assumption that E(yjcL) =
E(yj) IBCL and E(3CL) = E(13CL)2 , actually, the two cross terms exactly cancel.
7This result is similar to the infinite exaggeration result in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2000).
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fo, exaggeration increases. 8
2.2.2 Three-period model
In the two-period model above, the analyst makes all J forecasts before seeing any of the
realizations. In this section, we analyze how an analyst's past forecasting performance affects
her future exaggeration. We modify the model by assuming that agents observe the realizations
of the first J variables and then forecast a second group of K variables. Clients expect consistent
exaggeration within a group of random variables, but not necessarily across groups.
Clients estimate ability as before, except that they allow for different exaggeration in the
two sets of observations:
Wi j -+ (IiX- 1 J J+ K 2
a (1 + -Y + 6)- (Ej=l wxjy2 + z-j=+1 jy?p0 E xj + z.J j=j+l x 
J 2 J+K 2
+ g ZJ .j + 6 ao++b (J+K-1) 1+y+ ' °
W = a-
E(WKI J)
where J and K refer to the 3 for the first J and the second K random variables, respectively.
The weight w is the ratio between the observed exaggeration in the first set and the clients'
expectation of exaggeration in the second set of random variables, conditional on the observed
pJ. The first order condition for the agent when forecasting the second set of variables reduces
to:
wE(3JK IfJ )2 - 2 + A
K = wE(/ 5J) + A (2.13)
where PJK is the exaggeration factor estimated across both sets of observations, which will be
an average of w-lJ and K
Proposition 1 Equation (13) implies that agents will choose a AK that is between the one-
period optimal 31 = A-1 ( - 'y3) and their client's expectation E(K 3J).
SNotice that b(a, ) is a function of only A. This implies that when clients' prior beliefs about a and A are
uncorrelated, then exaggeration will signal neither high or low ability. If instead clients' believe that high-ability
agents face more (less) exogenous incentives to exaggerate, then exaggeration will signal high (low) ability. When
ability (a) and exogenous incentives to exaggerate (A) are more positively correlated, exaggeration signals high
ability and y and the equilibrium amount of exaggeration increase.
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Proof. In Appendix B 
Agents who have had bad luck in the past and realized a lower j than the 3 j they intended
will choose a lower K. This can be interpreted as the agents who have had bad luck in the
past and are thus under-rated will exaggerate more in order to increase the relative weight of
the later observations.9
2.3 Testing predictions of the model
The model in section 2 has three cross-sectional predictions about when we should expect more
exaggeration. Agents should exaggerate more when they are underrated by their clients, when
earnings realizations are expected to be noisy, and when they expect to make a limited number
of future forecasts. In this section of the paper we test these predictions using the I/B/E/S
analyst earnings forecast dataset and the methodology for measuring exaggeration outlined in
Chapter 1. Specifically, we estimate the average exaggeration coefficient for a specific group of
forecasts using the regression
A-C = a +(F-C) + (2.14)
as in the classical estimator described in section 2.1.2, where A is the I/B/E/S actual earnings
for a given firm-quarter combination, F is a forecast of earnings, and C is an econometric
expectation of earnings based on prior forecasts for that firm-quarter. l°0 We test the predictions
for how exaggeration should vary with a specific variable by interacting the right-hand side of
(14) with the variable of interest.
As we argue in Chapter 1, the regression in (14) produces an unbiased estimate of the inverse
of the exaggeration factor, 3 = b- 1, because the error term is the analyst's expectational error
at time of forecasting, e = A - E(Als, C), and expectational errors must be mean zero with
respect to all variables known at time of forecasting, including F - C. In order for interaction
9This prediction that under-rated agents should exaggerate more is also made by a different model in Graham
(1999).
'°The exaggeration measurement methodology, including the methodology for measuring C, is described in
more detail in Zitzewitz (2001). All earnings variables are normalized by the share price.
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versions of this regression to be valid, the analyst's expectational error must be mean zero with
respect to the interaction variable as well. This must be true for all variables that are known
at time of forecasting, but for variables that incorporate the econometricians knowledge of the
future, we will need to verify that the orthogonality condition still holds.
2.3.1 Under-rated analysts
Since it is impossible to directly observe which analysts have true ability that is higher than
their measured ability, we are forced to use our knowledge of the future to help identify under-
rated analysts. In particular, we divide analysts with a given past forecast information content
into those whose performance eventually rises and those whose performance falls and assume
that, on average, the analysts whose performance rises were under-rated in the past.
Specifically, we rank analysts with at least 50 past forecasts based on two variables: their
past forecast information content from observation 1 to j - 1 and the difference between their
past information content and their information content from observation j + 1 to j + 50 (or
fewer if the analyst leaves the sample). We then interact these rankings with the right-hand
side of equation (14).
Table 1 presents the results of such an interaction regression. The results suggest that under-
rated analysts exaggerate more, whether or not past performance is controlled for. The results
also do not change if we control for the analyst's career length or the size of their brokerage,
both of which have significant positive effects on ,.
In constructing this test, we took two steps to avoid violating the orthogonality condition
discussed above. First, we used different observations to measure performance improvement
(observations j + 1 to j + 50) and exaggeration (observation j). This is important since if an
analyst "gets lucky" and gets surprised in the direction of their deviation from the consensus
(i.e., A - E and F - C positively correlated), /B will be overestimated, exaggeration will be
underestimated, and analyst performance will be overestimated. Using different observations
avoids this potential problem. Second, we used aCL = /32 Var(x) as our performance measure, a
measure that is robust to exaggeration, so even if exaggeration in observation j were correlated
with exaggeration in observations j + 1 to j + 50 or 1 to j -1, this would not create a correlation
with our measure of the change in performance.
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2.3.2 Expected earnings uncertainty
We test for whether analysts exaggerate more when earnings are uncertain using a two-step
process (Table 2). In the first step, we predict the average absolute earnings surprise (actual less
consensus) for a particular firm-quarter based on market cap, the standard deviation of prior
outstanding forecasts, and the prior average absolute earnings surprise for the firm in question.
We hypothesize and find that average absolute earnings surprise is higher for small-cap firms,
when past forecasts are dispersed, and for firms for which average earnings surprise has been
large in the past. In the second step, we test the effect of expected earnings surprise on using
an interaction regression, finding that there is significantly more exaggeration when predicted
absolute earnings surprise is higher. Notice that in this analysis all of the interaction variables
are known at time of forecasting; thus the orthogonality condition should be satisfied.
2.3.3 Expected career length
The prediction that analysts should exaggerate less when they expect to make more future
forecasts is more difficult to test. We can use the actual number of future forecasts as our
interaction variable, and when we do this, we find less exaggeration by analysts who make more
future forecasts (Table 3, Panel A). A problem with this analysis is that analysts who have
good luck should both survive longer and have measured exaggeration that is less than what
they intended.
An alternative possible approach is to use variables that are known at time of forecasting that
predict an analyst's longevity. Probit regressions that predict an analyst's leaving the sample
and not returning for at least 2 years after a given forecast find longer survival is expected for
analysts who have made a large number of past forecasts, analysts who work at larger (usually
the more prestigous) brokerages, and analysts who have had better forecast accuracy in the
past (Table 3, Panel B).11
In Table 1, we found that analysts with more forecasting experience and analysts at larger
"Forecast information content, in turn, does not appear to play a role in predicting exits from the I/B/E/S
sample. One potential explanation for this result is that analysts can leave the I/B/E/S sample for either good
reasons (moving to lucrative proprietary researcg positions) or bad reasons (getting fired). We do find that for
analysts who stay in the profession, forecast information content helps explain which analysts are ranked highly
by Institutional Investor (Chapter 1, Table 7).
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brokerage firms exaggerated less. The probit regressions suggest that one potential explanation
for this result is that these analysts have longer expected careers, and the optimal exaggeration
rate for these analysts is lower. Alternative explanations exist, however. Analysts may become
less overconfident in their own information or better calibrated with experience. In the model
we assumed that analysts' utility is linear in the market valuation of their forecasts; if the
concavity of analyst's incentives varies with brokerage size or career length, this may also
explain the results. Inexperienced analysts may face greater outside options and thus more
convex incentives (i.e., they can gamble and then leave if it does work out), and this may explain
their greater exaggeration. Analysts at larger firms may be given more concave incentives by
their firm to reduce exaggeration, such as a risk of getting fired for deviating from the consensus
and being wrong that is not fully compensated by the reward for deviating from the consensus
and being right. A model in which firms have a collective reputation for exaggeration might
predict this, since larger firms will make more forecasts in the future than smaller firms and
thus would prefer that their analysts exaggerate less.
In summary, the empirical evidence that is available is consistent with the prediction that
analysts who expect to make more future forecasts should exaggerate less, but alternative
explanations for the results exist.
2.4 Conclusion
The evidence presented in Chapter 1 suggests that there are persistent differences in analyst's
exaggeration factors and forecast information content and that the best predictor of the future
value of an analyst's forecasts is the value of her past forecasts. This suggests that potential
clients should use an analyst's track record to determine how much to pay her. This paper
investigates the incentives for exaggeration created by clients attempting to learn ability from
forecasting record in a financial market environment where forecasts are valuable for their new
information content.
We find that career concerns can create an incentive for agents to exaggerate, or overweight
their private information. This incentive exists because high-ability analysts have viewpoints
that are more different from the consensus on average and since potential clients learn more
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quickly about an analyst's average difference with the consensus than about whether she is
exaggerating. The equilibrium exaggeration rate is finite so long as there is a sufficiently large
external incentive for absolute forecast accuracy. The model also predicts that agents should
exaggerate more when earnings are expected to be noisy, when they expect to make a limited
number of future forecasts, or when they are under-rated by the market, and we find that these
predictions are consistent with the equity analyst forecast data.
Although the evidence in the paper is for equity analysts, the issues examined in this
paper potentially apply to other opinion-producing agents. A large number of agents produce
opinions that can be thought of as forecasts of random variables. Especially when the actions
taken based on the opinions are strategic substitutes, the value of privileged access to an opinion
depends on its information content relative to the consensus. Whenever the realized values of
random variables are noisy, agents will learn more quickly about the average difference between
an agent's opinion and the consensus that they will about whether the agent is exaggerating,
an the agent will be able to raise estimates of her ability by exaggerating. This incentive to
exaggerate will be greater when the realization of the random variable is expected to be more
noisy, which makes exaggeration harder to detect, when the agent expects to leave the profession
soon, or when the agent perceives that she is under-rated by the market. These predictions,
together with the empirical support for them in the analyst data, are potentially useful for
consumers attempting to account for exaggerate in their interpretation of opinions or for firms
attempting to reduce exaggeration in the incentives they design for opinion-producers.
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rTable 2. Exaggeration and uncertainty
The effect of expected earnings uncertainty is examined by predicting the absolute
earnings surprise for a firm-quarter combination based on its market cap, the standard
deviation of price-normalized forecasts, and past earnings surprise for the firm, and
average earnings surprise in the prior 90 days. We then interact predicted earnings
surprise with the right-hand side of (2) to measure the effect on exaggeration. The
negative interaction coefficient reported implies more exaggeration when expected
earnings surprise is high.
Coeff. S.E.
First stage regression
Dependent variable: Abs(ACT - CONS)
Indepdent variables:
Ln(Market Cap) -0.0184 0.0009
Ln(SD-Price ratio) 0.0092 0.0004
Avg past abs(ACT - CONS) for firm 0.710 0.015
Avg abs(ACT - CONS) in quarter 0.136 0.007
Second stage
Interaction coefficient from exaggeration regression
Predicted abs. forecast error -0.059 0.022
Notes:
1. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering within
firm-quarter combinations. Standard error in second stage is adjusted for the use
of a predicted value on the right-hand side.
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Table 3. Exaggeration and expected future forecasts
In panel A, the right hand side of (14) is interacted with the actual number
of future forecasts an analyst makes between the current forecast and the
end of 1999. Forecasts for the years 1993-97 and for analysts who have
already made 50 forecasts are included in the sample. In Panel B, exit
from the I/B/E/S sample (defined as making a final forecast and not
reappearing in the sample for 2 years) is predicted for each forecast in the
1993-97 period. Past average relative forecast ranking is the average of a
0-1 ranking of analysts' relative forecast accuracy for each firm-quarter in
which they forecast.
Panel A. Interaction regression with actual future forecasts
Dependent variable: actual earnings less consensus
Coeff. S.E.
Forecast less consensus 0.251 0.067
(FOR - CONS)*(Actual future forecasts/100) 0.117 0.037
Constant (in basis points) -0.159 0.202
Actual future forecasts/100 (in basis points) -0.134 0.140
Observations 198,909
Panel B. Probit regression predicting exit from sample
Coeff. S.E.
Forecasts in career/100 -0.251 0.014
Ln(Analysts at brokerage) -0.090 0.010
Ln(Forecast information content) 0.001 0.003
Observations 334,388
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Chapter 3
A Strategic Rationale for Imperfect
Profit Measures
Summary 3 In models by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), firms competing in
quantities benefit strategically from committing to managerial incentives that are biased toward
revenue maximization. Little empirical evidence has been produced in support of these models,
and their assumption that incentive contracts are observable has been criticized as unrealis-
tic. Chapter 3 proposes an alternative model in which firms competing in strategic substitutes
commit to using less precise profit measures, which biases the optimal unobservable contract
towards revenue maximization. This model performs better empirically. Firms that compete
in strategic substitutes choose less precise profit measures across six different measures. Firms
with less precise profit measures in turn have stock returns and thus managerial incentives that
are driven more by revenue growth. Controlling for this channel, firms that compete in strate-
gic substitutes do not directly modify their managerial incentives in the direction predicted by
observable-contract models; on the contrary, having committed to more revenue-driven stock
returns, they actually undo part of the resulting incentive bias using their non-stock incentives,
which is consistent with unobservable contracts.
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3.1 Introduction
Industries are said to compete in strategic substitutes if the optimal response to an aggressive
action by one's competitor is passive.' In such industries, a firm finds it strategically valuable
to commit in advance to aggressive action in order to encourage a passive response from its
competitors (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984). Likewise, in industries that compete in strategic
complements, there is strategic value in committing to passive behavior in order to induce a
passive response from one's competitors. In models by Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd
(1987) and Sklivas (1987) (hereafter, FJS), owners of firms that are competing in strategic sub-
stitutes commit to aggressive action by observably shifting their managerial incentives towards
revenue maximization. 2
A crucial assumption in the FJS model is that managerial incentives are fixed and observable.
This assumption has been criticized as being unrealistic in a corporate setting because there
many ways to secretly undo a bias in the publicly announced incentives (e.g., by Katz, 1991).3
A firm in the FJS model would want to do exactly that: announce an incentive bias to induce
passive behavior from its competitors, and then revert secretly to rewarding profit maximization.
This paper proposes a model in which a firm's owner can credibly alter the optimal un-
observable managerial incentive contract by observably changing the precision of the profit
measures on which the incentive contracts are based. In particular, when profit and revenue
shocks are positively correlated, owners of firms competing in strategic substitutes can shift the
optimal contract towards revenue maximization by reducing the precision of the profit measure,
causing the optimal contract to rely on revenue to draw an inference about profit. Shifting the
optimal contract towards revenue maximization induces a different mix of managerial actions
that can be harmful to competitors and thus induce a passive response. For example, if an
' "Aggressive" and "passive" behavior is precisely defined throughout the paper as actions that reduce and
increase competitors' profits, respectively. The terminology of strategic substitutes and complements is due to
Bulow, Geanakopulous, and Klemperer (1985). Examples of competition in strategic substitutes include quantity
(Cournot) competition and situations in which deterring participation is important; price (Bertrand) competition
is an example of competition in strategic complements.
2In a related model by Vickers (1985), an owner achieves strategic commitment by appointing an agent with
an observable taste for aggressive behavior.
3The observability assumption is less of a problem in a strategic trade context (e.g., Brander and Spencer,
1985; Maggi, 1996), where a government provides a revenue or export subsidy to shift home firms' incentives
towards sales maximization, since it is harder for a government to secretly undo a subsidy.
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agent can raise revenue by the same amount through either an easy but less profitable action
(e.g., price cutting) or a difficult but more profitable action (e.g., improving the product), shift-
ing incentives toward revenue maximization would induce more discounting and less product
improvement. Owners of firms competing in strategic complements can likewise shift the op-
timal contract towards profit maximization and thus induce of mix of managerial actions that
increases competitors' profits, inducing a passive response.
Whereas I am aware of no empirical evidence in support of the original FJS model,4 this
paper presents cross-sectional evidence consistent with an unobservable-contracts version of
the model. In particular, I find that firms in industries that compete in strategic substitutes
provide significantly less voluntary disclosure and less meaningful accounting profits across six
different measures in both North American and non-North American samples. This result is
even stronger when controlling for the factors found to affect disclosure policy in other studies.
Firms with limited disclosure policies, in turn, have stock returns that depend on revenue
growth in addition to earnings growth. Since managerial incentives are heavily influenced by
stock returns, incentives are distorted toward revenue in industries that compete in strategic
substitutes. Controlling for this channel, I find no evidence that firms in industries competing
in strategic substitutes directly alter their managerial incentives in the direction predicted by an
observable contracts model. On the contrary, I find evidence that these firms, having committed
to a limited disclosure policy that biases their stock returns towards rewarding revenue growth,
actually undo part (but only part) of the incentive bias using their non-stock incentives. This
evidence is all consistent with the unobservable-contracts model in this paper and inconsistent
with observable-contract models.
The evidence is thus that, controlling for other factors affecting optimal disclosure policy,
firms competing in strategic substitutes choose a disclosure policy that causes their managerial
incentives to be biased in a strategically advantageous way. This does not necessarily imply
that the firms have consciously chosen their disclosure policies with the model in this paper
'This comment is based on a Social Sciences Citation Index search of all articles citing either Fershtman
and Judd (1987) or Sklivas (1987) and on conversations with colleagues. The most closely related empirical
papers test whether relative performance evaluation is more or less common in industries competing in strategic
substitutes (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Kedia, 1998) or whether vertical separation is more common among
gas stations facing inelastic demand (Slade, 1998). The lack of empirical evidence supporting FJS is more striking
given that it has been cited by over 100 theoretical papers in the journals covered by the SSCI.
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in mind. Firms competing in strategic substitutes (complements) may as a general rule be
uncooperative (cooperative) with their competitors, and may choose their disclosure policies
accordingly. Alternatively, firms with limited (full) disclosure may have come to dominate
industries competing in strategic substitutes (complements) through an evolutionary process.
In a industry that competes in quantities, a limited disclosure policy will lead managers to
increase and rivals to reduce quantities; firms with limited disclosure policy would tend to
become more prominent and more emulated in such industries. Likewise, in a price-competition
industry, a firm with limited disclosure might find itself in more frequent price wars, forcing it
into bankruptcy or a change in tactics. Regardless of whether firms have chosen strategically
optimal disclosure policies consciously, through an evolutionary process, or as part of a general
rule of competitive conduct, the fact that they have done so remains interesting.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. The next section presents a
model in which strategic commitment considerations affect optimal disclosure policy. The third
section presents the cross-sectional empirical evidence referred to above. A conclusion follows.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Overview
The goal of the model is to analyze how strategic commitment considerations affect the optimal
precision of the profit measure, which in practice a company affects through its voluntary dis-
closure and accounting policies. Using a less precise profit measure increases the costs related
to managerial risk aversion and the deviation of managerial behavior from non-strategic profit
maximization. These costs can be outweighed in industries which compete in strategic substi-
tutes, since committing to less precise profit measurement, more revenue-oriented incentives,
and thus more aggressive managerial behavior induces passive behavior or non-participation
by competitors. For this to be the case, we need the actions taken when incentives shift from
profit to revenue to decrease competitors profits (as with price cutting) rather than increase it
(as with advertising that raises industry demand).
Precise profit measures also have costs and benefits less central to the model. Precise profit
measures can lower reduce potential information asymmetry and thus lower the cost of equity
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and debt capital (Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998) but the voluntary disclosure required to
improve the precision of outsiders' understanding of a company's profitability can be costly to
produce and can give valuable intelligence to competitors. 5 The combination of factors related
and unrelated to strategic commitment produce an optimal profit measurement precision.
The model yields three testable predictions:
1. Less precise profit measures cause the optimal managerial contract to reward revenue more
and profit less when profit and revenue shocks are positively correlated (Propositions 3).
2. All else equal, firms competing in strategic substitutes will choose less precise profit mea-
surement since doing so reduces competitor's expected profits and encourages passive
behavior and non-participation (Proposition 5).
3. Under certain conditions, firms competing in strategic substitutes will choose limited
disclosure in order to commit to having their stock returns reward revenue growth but
will then partially undo the incentive bias using their unobservable non-stock incentives
(Proposition 4).
3.2.2 The model
Two firms compete in a industry. 6 In each firm, a long-run value maximizing board of directors
acts as the principal, first choosing an observable precision for the profit measure, then making
a participation decision based on expected profits and the realization of a random fixed cost,
and then engaging in multi-action principal-agent contracting as in Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991). The timing of the model is as follows:
1. Both boards simultaneously decide how much noise (with variance ni) to have in their
5For other costs of precise profit measures, see Barros (1997) for a model in which owners limit the collection
of performance information in order to commit to lower bargaining power and thus less ability to extract surplus
from employees making specific investments. See also Zabojnik (1998) for a model in which owners provide
revenue maximization incentives to managers to reduce incentives for cost reduction in order to encourage
specific investments by employees.
6We limit the analysis to the two-firm case for simplicity. In a model with more than two firms there could
be higher-order effects of disclosure policy, e.g. a limited disclosure policy could encourage passive behavior by
one competitor, but this could in turn encourage more aggressive behavior by another competitor.
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measure of profits 7rt = ri + ei. Revenue is observed perfectly.7 There is a cost n(ni)
associated with this decision if they later choose to participate that captures the other
costs and benefits of disclosure discussed above.
2. The boards observe the measurement choice of the other firm, learn the fixed cost fi
of participating in the industry (distributed Fi), and simultaneously decide whether to
participate. 8
3. The boards contract with their managers. Contracts are assumed to be linear9 and of the
form wi = ai + /3i~r* + yiri + iPi,l where wi, r*, ri, and Pi are the managerial compen-
sation, measured profits, revenue, and the market value of firm i. Using accounting-based
measures carries a cost of mi(3i, yi) = h(f, 2 + -2), where h is a parameter indicating
the severity of these costs. l l Boards have complete bargaining power and set the agent's
expected utility equal to her reservation utility.
4. The agents choose a vector of actions ai.
5. Profit and revenue are realized. They are equal to
and re are expected gross profit and revenue and e
7re(aia-i) + e, where 7re
re(ai, a stochastic disturbance.
is a stochastic disturbance.
7This admittedly extreme assumption is made for simplicity; it would be sufficient to assume merely that the
noise in the revenue is not infinite, so that revenue provides some information about true profitability when the
profit measure is noisy.
SHaving participation decisions made after the realization of a fixed cost causes the probability of partic-
ipation to depend on expected profits, allowing a firm to reduce the likelihood of a competitor's participa-
tion by lowering their expected profits. This modelling device allows us to capture in a one-period model the
participation-deterrence rationale for lowering competitor's expected profits; in a more complicated multi-period
model, reducing future participation could also provide a rationale for lowering competitors' expected profits
(e.g., long purse predation as in Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990).
9 Linear contracts are optimal due to the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion utility and a joint
normal error term if the single period in this model is viewed as the aggregation of several smaller periods
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). Linear contracts can also be motivated by requiring that the agent not be able
to gain by shifting profits or sales intertemporarly.
l 0Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is assumed to be infeasible. If contracts were observable, principals
could condition managerial wages on competitors' profits in order to commit to aggressive or passive actions
(e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Joh, 1999). Even with unobservable contracts, a principal would want to
use RPE to filter out common shocks to productivity (Holmstrom, 1979) and the amount of RPE used might
increase with the variance of one's own profit measure if actions that decreased competitor's profits tended to
increase own profits. This would provide another means through which an imprecise profit measure commits a
firm to managerial incentives that reward aggressive actions. For simplicity, these effects are ruled out.
1 One possible motivation for such an assumption is that the market valuation of a firm is harder to manipulate
than accounting figures, and thus using accounting-based incentives leads to a certain amount of manipulation
that is costly (due to the managerial effort expended, potential shareholder lawsuits, etc.).
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We assume that profit and revenue shocks are positively but not perfectly correlated
(Otr(7r > 7r > 0).
6. The market values the firm at P = E(7r I r*, r), based on its inference about the true
7r from the observed r* and r. The board maximizes expected long-run value (the true
value of P), while managerial contracts can only be written on the near-term valuation
inferred from r* and r.
7. The agent receives wi and experiences constant absolute risk aversion utility U2 = - exp{-p[w i -
c(ai)]), where c(ai) is the private cost of the agent's actions and p is the risk aversion
coefficient.
Firms are assumed to behave non-cooperatively and to reach a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The assumption of non-cooperative behavior is central to the prediction that firms choose less
disclosure in industries that compete in strategic substitutes. If firms used disclosure policy as a
means for making collusion more sustainable, we might expect them to agree on more disclosure
in either type of industry depending on the benefits of sustaining collusion.l2 Focusing on a
symmetric equilibrium is done partly for convenience and partly because the data on disclosure
policy suggest a high degree of within-industry uniformity.l3
3.2.3 Solution of model
The model is solved backwards by solving the market valuation, agents' action choice, principals'
contracting, and principals' measurement choice problems in succession. To make the model
more tractable, we make four assumptions:
Assumption 1 The Hessians of the private cost and the expected gross profit and revenue
functions (given a set of actions by the other firm), Caa, ,,aa, and Raa, are positive definite,
negative definite, and negative definite, respectively. This implies that the matrix Wa =
12If sustaining collusion were the main strategic consideration affecting disclosure policy, we might expect to
see maximum disclosure in industries with intermediate concentration levels. The fact that we do not see such
a relationship in Section 3 increases our comfort in focusing on non-cooperative behavior.
'lSee Hermalin (1994) or Gal-Or (1999) for models in which the best response to weak incentives or delegation
may be strong incentives or non-delegation.
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Caa - 'fII - y'Raa is positive definite for all fi', Y > 0, which ensures a unique solution to the
agent's problem. The derivative of W. with respective to the action vector a is assumed to be
small enough that it can be ignored.
Assumption 2 The matrix (1 - 3')Iaa - '7 Raa is assumed to be negative definite for any
combination of ',-y' chosen by the principal. This ensures a unique solution to the principal's
contracting problem.
Assumption 3 While the net other costs of disclosure can be positive or negative (n' X 0),
the function is assumed to be sufficiently convex to ensure a unique optimum disclosure policy
(ni > o).
Assumption 4 In this paper, we are interested in the case where a shift toward revenue
maximization and away from profit maximization decreases competitor's profits; we therefore
dVD
assume that ( -i)'(ap doti + a, dy') < 0 if d3i < 0 and d"y' > 0.
Market valuation
The market values the firm at E(7ri n,ri). The market's inference about true profitability
is the average of measured profitability and the profitability implied by the revenue measure,
weighted according to their variances:
Eri I r*t ri = [0'7rr nr 2 (I- R2 )
(ri -2 e + 5e]' ni + 7r*-E·i 0grS = _ o- ni + a(1 -R2)
where e and Fe here refer to the market's rational expectations of 7r and r, which in equilibrium
will always equal re and re, and R2 refers to I. Notice that increasing profit noise (ni)
causes the market to rely more on revenue for information about profits, and since revenue
and profits positively covary (ar > 0), higher revenue leads the market to infer higher profits.
Substituting the market valuation equation into the managerial incentive contract yields the
following reduced-form incentives for managers:
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I
w (3+ 2o(1 -R2) + fa r ni
ni = ai + (p + R 2) Ti + [i +i ( 2 (1 - R2))] ri,
pn~i v~~~~K\ ~  ~ ~~ T ~ ,yiY
where /' and y'i are the manager's total incentives for profits and revenue, including direct
incentives and the impact on the stock price.
Agent's problem
Agents, like firms, are assumed to reach a Nash Equilibrium, they therefore maximize utility
given the actions of the other firm. The agent chooses actions to maximize her certainty
equivalent utility:
max a + ,3' 7re(ai, a_i) + i re(ai, ai)-t( , ) -(ai),
ai
Expected wage Risk Effort
aversion cost
cost
where the risk-aversion cost of using high-powered incentives t( P, ) = e * (P2( + ni) +
tPI3a'rr + yI2a2 ). The first-order condition is ca = 3'i7ra + Y'ra where ca, Ira, and ra are the
gradients of the private cost and the expected profit and revenue functions with respect to the
agent's actions.
Principal's contracting problem
The principal chooses the incentive contract to maximize true, rather than inferred, expected
firm value (excluding the predetermined fixed and net disclosure costs but including the accounting-
based incentive cost). Firms are assumed to reach a Nash Equilibrium, and thus maximize value
given the actions of the other firm:
max re(a (, ), a) - c(a (Yi,,y')) - t(3, yi)-m(13i, y ).
This problem can be solved in two stages. In the first stage, we derive the lowest cost
(i.e., lowest m(,3i, yi)) combination of pi, i, 6i that achieves a given i3i and tY'. In the second
stage, we derive the optimal /i and 'y. The first-order conditions from the first problem can
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'T
be combined to show that:
pi aO2(1 - R2)
-< 0
,Yi _rr · ni
This expression implies that i and yi have opposite signs. Given the costliness of accounting-
based incentives, market-based incentives are used to get the correct power of incentives, and.
then the accounting-based incentives are used to fine tune the relative importance of profit and
revenue.14 The variable u is the ratio of the stock price responses to an extra dollar of reported
profits and revenue, respectively. The above expression, together with the definitions of ' and
'i, can be used to express bi as a function of 6ig and 'i:
_ ni + o(1 -R 2) + i o[ni + 2 (1 - R2)]
2 a2(1 - R 2 ) 2 Ur ni
Thus the minimum-cost ,i, yi, and 6i can be expressed as a function of 3i and 'i with
,i = 6 -y - i and yi - . The first-order conditions of the second-stage problem are:
m, + t, = (7r-c') ail,
m,, + t, = (r' c-c *ai,
To find a, and a, we differentiate the agent's first order condition with respect to /i and
i. This yields a*, = W-'rXa and a, = W- 1 ra. Substituting these expressions and the agent's
first order condition into the principal's first order conditions yields
7r = [7r + p (ni + f2) + ] ' + (a + P -r - v) 
7rI( = (y + P . U -rr v) ' ,i + (r + p c + v) · y,
where we define v = h(p - l + / ), r = 7rW-lra, 7r = 7r'W-lra, rp = rW-7ra., and
"4Market-based incentives providing the bulk of pay-for-performance incentives is consistent with the empirical
evidence (Hall and Liebman, 1998, and Section 3). For a model in which the weights placed on performance
measures by the market and by the optimal managerial contract differ, see Paul (1993).
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r = r' W-ra. Notice that all of these expressions are scalars and that since W - 1 is symmetric,
rv = rp. These simultaneous equations can be solved to yield expressions for i and -i':
7rp(ry + p. a2+vA) -7r( + p. o rr-v)
[p (ni+a2) + ,v - -r (P -a.)
?'irrp = r (3.2)[X, + (n +0) + ](r, + p. 2+vj) - (, + p a -v)2
Intermediate results
Proposition 1 The following intermediate results can be derived from equations (1) and (2):
1. When accounting incentives are costless (h = v = v= = O), if the agent is risk neutral
(p = 0) the principal "sells the firm" to the agent, setting I3j = 1 and 0y = .
2. An increase in the uncertainty affecting profits or revenue will reduce the power of the
incentive for that measure (i.e., Ia, < 0).
3. When the agent is risk averse (p > 0), her earnings are increasing in both profit and
revenue (,3', y > 0).
Proof. The first two statements are immediate from (1) and (2). The third statement
follows from the fact that the numerator and denominators of (1) and (2) are always positive
since 7rory > Žrc, Tr, ,U > or and v, > O0. To see that the numerator of (2) is always positive,
note from the Principal's first-order condition that "I is a weighted average of n'i+,2 , -, and
7r-, O r
-p with positive weights and is thus less than i+2. ·
Proposition 2 As the profit measurement noise rises to infinity ni - oo, the optimal contract
converges to a revenue-only contract with , -- 0 and y - (raW-1ra)- lr W-l1'ra·
Proof. Take the limit of (1) and (2) and substitute in the definitions of rp, 7r,, and r,. 
The obvious analogy with weighted least squares regression is instructive. The principal sets
'- to approximate profit maximization, lowering the power of the incentive to accommodate the
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agent's risk aversion. If actions are uni-dimensional and risk aversion is very low, yi reduces to
7ra/ra (the profit margin on the last dollar of revenue) and the revenue-only contract produces
the same actions and profits as the full contract. If actions are multi-dimensional, however,
revenue-only contracts produce only the best approximation of the full contract - with at least
slightly lower powered incentives and a different mix of actions. It is how the mix of actions
changes as profit measurement gets noisier and incentives shift toward revenue that determines
whether imperfect profit measures have strategic value. 15
The next proposition captures the impact of imperfect disclosure on managerial incentives.
When profits are measured perfectly (ni = 0) and revenues do not contain additional infor-
mation about performance; the optimal contract places no weight on revenue. As profit noise
increases, however, both market returns and managerial compensation under the optimal con-
tract depend more on revenues and less on profits.
Proposition 3 As profits are less perfectly measured, the optimal contract becomes less profit-
based and more revenue-based (- < O, > 0).
Proof. In Appendix C. 
Under certain conditions, an increase in profit noise will cause the market to shift more
towards rewarding revenue than the optimal managerial. In this case, some of this shift toward
revenue in market returns will be undone in the unobservable managerial contract using the
accounting-based incentives.
Proposition 4 Under certain conditions, the firm will use the accounting-based incentives in
the unobservable managerial contract to undo part of the revenue-bias in market valuations
caused by profit noise (i.e., will set 3i > 0 and yi < 0). A sufficient condition is that the
correlation between profit-motivated and revenue-motivated managerial actions (which affects
1
'Notice also that as the optimal power of incentives rises as the correlation between the actions induced by
rewarding measured output (revenue) and true output (profits) increases. It is the correlation between the actions
induced by rewarding an imperfect and the ideal measure of profits that affects the optimal power of incentives,
not the correlation between the measures themselves. Feltham and Xie (1994) and Baker (1999) also make this
point, and they derive measures that are similar to but arguably less intuitive than the weighted least-squares
regression of the actions motivated by a perfect measures on those motivated by an imperfect measure derived
in Proposition 2.
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the weight placed on revenue by optimal managerial incentives) be sufficiently low relative to
the correlation between revenue and profit shocks (which affects the weight placed on revenue by
the market), i.e. that = (/ W-1 7ra)1 7aW _1 ra < .16
21- I!2!Proof. Note that pi > 0 X yi < 0 X 3'i > i ni+a2(-R 2) = + 7i ) X =pi > Yi 
Substitute for 3' and y'i and reduce to get condition in footnote. Note that under the conditions
in the proposition this condition is satisfied, since 7rrv - r2 > 0. ·
Principal's profit noise selection and participation problem
The final step in solving the model is to calculate the effect of added profit noise on expected
profits taking into account the effect on competitor's actions and participation. The effect of an
increase in profit noise depends on how it affects a firm's own and its competitor's actions and
on how actions affect expected profit. Define an = (a. -. + a d) to be the impact of added
da-i
profit noise on a firm's own actions. Also define Ajk = a to be the matrix of one firm's best
k
responses to the other's actions. By the envelope theorem, the impact of added profit noise on
own and competitor's net profits assuming both enter is:
- = ( I_ )(Aa) - 2 .P
Oni -A i ) a )
Firms participate if their expected profits are greater than the realization of their fixed cost
Vi > fi. Expected profits conditional on participation are given by:
E(V¼IV > fi) = V M (ni) + F_i{E[V_i(ni, n_i)] . [ViD(ni, n_i) - VM(ni)]
Unconditional expected profits are a monotonically increasing function of conditional ex-
pected profits, so ni is chosen by maximizing the above expression. The solution concept is
again Nash equilibrium, so expected profits are maximized taking ni as given. The first order
condition is:
fi The exact condition for /3i > 0 is that rr- - 7r2> p{7r [(ni + 2 ) + ,rr - 7(Orr/I + 2)}.
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avM vD dFi .M D)OniM .(1-- Fi) +-'F-i- ( ' ('i ' Fi) (ViM- v/D)'=0
Oni Oni dEVi
substituting for t- and including net disclosure costs yields an expression with four distinct
effects:
OVD dFi 9VDF_ (- _)Aa_.- __ .- ·F . (VM - V)) - 2D) P= '(
6aiAn dEVi 9ni 2 N
~--~ 
-· '· v-- - Net
Strategic Participation deterrence Risk disclosure
response of aversion costcost
competitor
Proposition 5 Given our assumption that n(n) is convex enough to ensure an optimal solu-
tion, we know that any increase (decrease) in one of the effects on the left-hand side will increase
(decrease) the optimal profit noise. When a shift in managerial incentives toward revenue and
away from profit reduces competitors' profit (as in Assumption 4):
1. The participation deterrence effect is positive.
2. The strategic response effect is positive (negative) when actions are strategic substitutes
(complements), i.e. when the reaction matrix A is negative (positive) definite.
Proof. The first statement follows from Assumption 4 and Proposition 3. The proof of the
second is in Appendix C. 
Propositions 3, 4, and 5 give us three predictions that we can test in the next section,
namely, that firms in industries that compete in strategic substitutes should have less precise
profit measures (Proposition 5), that less precise profit measures should shift market returns and
managerial incentives toward rewarding revenue when profit and revenue shocks are positively
correlated (Proposition 3), and that firms may use their accounting-based incentives to undo
some of the incentives created by market returns (Proposition 4).
3.3 Empirical evidence
This section presents three findings that coincide with the three main predictions from the
model above:
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1. Firms that compete in strategic substitutes provide less voluntary disclosure and less
meaningful profit figures.
2. Both firms that provide less disclosure and those that compete in strategic substitutes
have shareholder returns that depend more on revenue growth and less on profit growth.
Shareholder returns play a large enough role in determining managerial compensation
(both explicitly and by affecting bonuses and other incentive plans) that these firms also
have managerial incentives that depend more on sales growth and less on profit growth.
3. Controlling for the effects of shareholder returns, firms that compete in strategic sub-
stitutes have incentives that are biased away from revenue growth. This bias is only
large enough to partially undo the bias towards revenue created by shareholder returns.
It is consistent with firms choosing a limited disclosure policy to commit to bias their
incentives towards revenue and then attempting to secretly undo part of this bias.l7
Of these three findings, the most attention is devoted to the first. That firms should
pursue a different disclosure policy based whether their industry more closely resembles Cournot
or Bertrand competition is the most unique theoretical prediction and empirical finding of
this paper, therefore deserving the most attention. The first part of the second finding, that
firms competing in strategic substitutes have revenue-biased managerial incentives, is predicted
by both this paper and by observable-contract FJS models. The second part of the second
finding, that profits play a greater role stock returns and incentives for firms that provide
better profit measures, is a prediction of many models but is important because firms would
not reduce disclosure for the reasons modelled above if it made managerial incentives depend
less on revenue. The final finding, that firms appear to undo part of the disclosure-related
incentive bias, is also a unique prediction of the model in this paper. Given that believing the
third finding requires believing the first two, however, this finding receives the least attention
of the three.
'
7 When we say that firms' accounting-based incentives are secret, we mean that they are not credibly observed
by the other firm. The accounting-biased incentives are fully anticipated in a rational-expectations equilibrium,
and, in practice, they are often observed in proxy statements. By claiming that they are not credibly observed,
however, we are saying that a firm would not achieve a commitment by distorting them away from the non-
strategic best response, since the firm could always be undoing the distortion with unobserved relational contracts.
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The character of the evidence in this section is necessarily cross-sectional. Firms and in-
dustries rarely shift suddenly from quantity to price competition. 18 Firms and industries do
sometimes shift from a non-competitive (and thus non-strategic) environment to a competitive
one, but these shifts tend to either happen in countries in which managerial compensation data
is unavailable or involve regulatory changes that also affect disclosure directly. 19 Given the need
to rely on cross-sectional evidence, particular care must be taken to identify and control for
omitted variables that also affect disclosure policy or managerial incentives and could be cor-
related with an industry's strategic environment; this will be done as each finding is discussed
below.
3.3.1 Strategic environment and disclosure policy
Measurement choices and data sources
The first step in testing whether firms competing in strategic substitutes provide less voluntary
disclosure is developing measures of an industry's strategic environment and a firm's disclosure
policy. The more difficult measurement issue is determining whether an industry competes in
strategic substitutes or complements. Almost all industries actually make both types of com-
petitive choices; they make participation and investment decisions that are strategic substitutes
and then pricing decisions that are strategic complements. An industry more closely resem-
bles pure quantity competition as its initial capacity decisions become more important. In a
strategic trade model by Maggi (1996), firms choose capacities that they can later exceed by
paying an additional marginal cost. The size of this additional marginal cost provides an index
of the strategic nature of competition; when it is infinite, competition reduces to pure quantity
competition; when it is zero, competition reduces to pure price competition. Empirically, this
metric of the importance of the capacity decision is most naturally proxied by the capital inten-
sity of the industry; in capital-intensive industries, capacity is expensive to build and difficult
to exceed, while this is less the case in labor-intensive industries. The capital-output ratio is
thus my main proxy for the strategic nature of competition.
lAn exception is a capital-intensive industry that passes from a capacity-building phase to having persistent
overcapacity (e.g., steel), although such changes are hardly ever sudden.
19 Examples that were considered and rejected include the opening up of the South African economy to trade
after the end of apartheid-era sanctions and the introduction of competition into electricity generation.
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In addition to using measured capital intensity as a proxy, I also performed an ad hoc clas-
sification of two-digit industries according to the perceived importance of capacity decisions
and thus the degree to which an industry resembles pure quantity rather than differentiated
price competition. Agriculture, mining, air transportation, and telecommunications, and cer-
tain capital-intensive manufacturing sectors are classified as quantity competition while con-
struction, wholesale and retail trade, services, and certain light manufacturing industries are
classified as price competition (Table 1). These judgements can be debated, of course, but they
are consistent with how the industries are usually approached in single-industry models and are
in any case highly correlated with capital intensity.
Other proxies for the strategic nature of competition are also considered. Investments
in cost-reducing technology are strategic substitutes in many oligopoly models; the average
total factor productivity growth in an industry might therefore be considered a proxy for the
importance of cost reducing investments and thus the strategic nature of competition. Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999) use the Herfindahl index as a proxy, arguing that "a firm in a more
concentrated industry will have fewer close substitutes for its products" (p. 26) and thus less
resemble differentiated price competition. To provide a link with the limited prior literature in
this area, this variable was also considered.2
The measurement of voluntary disclosure is more straightforward. Two samples of firms are
used in the analysis: a North American sample of firms from the Standard & Poors COMPUS-
TAT database and a World sample of firms from S&P's Global Vantage database. The primary
disclosure measure for the North American sample was the voluntary disclosure scores given
to 415 North American industrial firms by the American Institute of Management Research
(AIMR).21 In addition, binary indicators of specific disclosure policies are also used. For the
20One approach that was considered and not adopted is that of Kedia (1998). Kedia attempts to directly
estimate the sign of the effect of a competitor's action on the marginal profitability of one's own action, using
an firms' sales as the proxy for its action. Unfortunately, this approach does not perform well empirically. Kedia
classifies industries if a regression coefficient is significant at the 10% level and yet classifies only 13% of the
industries. Kedia also allows the strategic nature of competition to vary by year; 30% of industries are classified
as substitutes in one year and complements in another, a hard-to-interpret result. Furthermore, although Kedia
mentions a few classifications that make intuitive sense, my own attempts to replicate her classifications suggest
that they are not generally intuitive.
21See Lang and Lundholm (1993) for a description of this data. The scores were normalized to a percentage
of points possible. Scores were not used for firms in excluded industries (Annex Table 1) and a few scores for
non-North American firms or which could not be matched with COMPUSTAT.
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North American sample, variables are also available for whether a firm held a conference call in
March, April, or May 1997, whether a firm achieved an unqualified audit opinion, and whether
a firm engaged a "Big-Six" auditor.22 For the World sample, variables for whether a firm
reported fully consolidated results and whether a firm published results using U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP) were used in addition to the unqualified opinion and
Big Six auditor variables.23
The North American and World samples were drawn from the publicly traded firms included
in the COMPUSTAT and Global Vantage datasets, respectively. For most measures, data from
the years 1987-98 was used, but AIMR data was only available from 1987-95. Financial firms
(SIC 6), non-market services such as health, legal, and educational services (SIC 8 and 9), and
utilities and non-air transportation were excluded from the sample. Firms with missing asset
data or less than $1 million in assets were excluded; this reduced the North American sample
significantly. A small number of observations with very large financial ratios were also excluded
(Annex Table 1). This yielded a sample of 4,596 North American and 9,262 World firms with
asset data and 3,570 North American and 8,370 World firms with all financial variables. AIMR
scores were available for 368 of the North American firms with asset data and for 257 of those-
with all financial variables.24
Summary statistics and results
Tables 2 and 3 provide summary statistics by strategic category for the variables mentioned
above plus other firm and industry characteristics that may influence disclosure. In North
America, firms that compete in strategic substitutes have lower disclosure scores, were less likely
to hold a conference call, less likely to obtain an unqualified audit opinion, but were slightly
22The conference call variable was collected from the First Call database; the audit opinion and auditor
variables are from COMPUSTAT. Achieving an unqualified audit opinion is interpreted as a disclosure policy
choice since companies can almost always achieve an unqualified opinion by complying with the requests of their
auditors for information.
23The literature provides some motivation for using these measures. Alford, et. al. (1993) finds that firms
reporting non-consolidated earnings have lower earnings-response coefficients. Leuz and Verrecchia (1999) find
that bid-ask spreads decline when German firms adopt U.S. GAAP. Becker, et. al. (1998) find that firms with
non-big 6 auditors report higher and more variable discretionary accurals.
2 4The number of firms is focused on as the relevant measure of sample size as the within-firm variation in
disclosure policy is very low (Annex Table 2).
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more likely to use a Big-Six auditor.25 In the World sample, firms competing in strategic
substitutes were less likely to obtain an unqualified audit opinion, report consolidated results,
or use a Big Six auditor but more likely to use U.S. GAAP.
As discussed above, firms' optimal disclosure policy can also be affected by non-strategic
factors which should be controlled for. Disclosure can reduce asymmetric information and thus
lower the costs of equity and debt capital (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Botosan, 1997; Sengupta,
1998), and firms that are raising capital have been found to choose higher levels of disclosure
(Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Frankel, et. al., 1995; Tasker, 1997). Larger firms have also been
found to provide higher levels of disclosure, which is logical since the benefits of higher valuations
rise directly in proportion to a firm's size while the costs of disclosure probably do not. More
profitable firms have likewise been found to provide more disclosure, although theoretically the
direction of the relationship is ambiguous.2 6
Taking these factors into account, the net benefits (NETBEN) of adopting a specific dis-
closure policy can be expressed as:
NETBEN = a NEWEQ + b NEWDT + c PROFIT +
[d(STRAT) - e -ASSETS - f (ASSETS)E + 9,
where a and b are the cost of capital benefits of disclosure per unit of new equity and debt
capital raised (NEWEQ and NEWDT) , c is the benefit of a higher valuation multiple for
earnings (PROFIT), d(STRAT) is the strategic benefit modelled in this paper, e is the cost
of disclosing information to competitors, f · (ASSETS)E is the actual cost of providing the
information, and g is an error term. Normalizing this equation by assets yields:
2 Throughout the paper, firms are classified according to their primary SIC industry, as reported in COMPU-
STAT or Global Vantage. I also used the Segments data to construct a weighted average of the characteristics
of the industries in which each firm competed, but results were very similar.
2 6 On the one hand, share-owning managers may be more interested in ensuring that good news is fully reflected
in valuations than bad news. On the other hand, poor performing firms may want to disclose more to protect
themselves from shareholder lawsuits, while high performing firms may want to keep their success a secret for
competitive reasons.
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NETBEN NEWEQ NEWDT[d(STRAT) - e] + a +b-ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS
ASSETS+c ASSETS - f (ASSETS)-' + g'
using operating profit (EBIT) as the measure of profits and replacing the error term with a
normalized one which in practice is less heteroskedastic. This expression can be naturally used
in a probit model of the adoption of discrete disclosure policies (e.g., using a Big Six auditor).
It can also be applied to a continuous measure of disclosure policy like the AIMR rating by
interpreting NETBEN and the letters as the benefit from a incremental increase in disclosure,
assuming that g' decreases with disclosure, and rewriting the above expression to solve for the
level of disclosure at which the net incremental benefit is zero.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results from estimations of the above model using different
disclosure measures and different proxies for the strategic nature of competition. 27 Firm size is
significant in every regression, but the other financial control variables are not jointly significant
in about half the specifications,2 8 and therefore results are presented both with and without
financial controls. Firms that compete in strategic substitutes are found to have significantly
lower AIMR scores and be significantly less likely to hold conference calls regardless of the
proxy chosen for strategic environment. These firms are also less likely to obtain an unqualified
audit opinion, report consolidated results, or use U.S. GAAP (in the countries where they have
a choice). In contrast, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between strategic
environment and using a Big-Six auditor.
The AIMR scores are constructed by committees of financial analysts that are specialists
in a particular industry sector and often use rating criteria that are specific to each sector.
Most researchers that have used the AIMR scores have therefore limited themselves to using
the within-sector information. Since this paper is interested is how disclosure varies with an
27The individual regressions for each disclosure variable are presented in Annex Tables 2 and 3. Given the
presence of random effects in the models, to simplify the estimation procedure, the parameter f was estimated
first to be about 0.8 in a non-linear least squares regression and then this value was used in subsequent regressions.
Although this procedure is not ideal, it was viewed as adequate given that the results were very similar when
parameters of 0.5 or 0.9 were used instead.
28In particular, they are never significant at the 10% level in regressions with the AIMR score as the dependent
variable and are not significant in 25% of the probit regressions.
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industry's strategic environment, however, the between-sector information in the AIMR scores
is particularly important. In Table 4, cross-sector differences in AIMR scores are allowed for
by including AIMR-sector random effects in the regression. This approach assumes that any
cross-sector differences in AIMR scoring criteria are not related to the strategic environment
of the industry, in other words, that analysts in strategic complements industries like retail do
not have lower rating standards than analysts in strategic substitutes industries like mining.
It is not possible to test this assumption using the entire dataset since most AiMR sectors
do not have sufficient variation in capital intensity, but we can examine the limited number
of sectors that do have such variation. Table 6 replicates the analysis in the first column for
the six sectors with the most within-sector variation in capital intensity and finds a similar
relationship between disclosure and our proxy for the strategic nature of competition.
Table 7 compares the results for the capital intensity and strategic classification proxies
with those for the other proxies, total factor productivity growth and the Herfindahl index, and
examines the effect of controlling for unionization. Unionization is positively correlated with
capital intensity and negatively correlated with disclosure; including it in regressions reduces
the size of the coefficients for the proxies for strategic substitutes by about 30-40 percent but,
with the exception of the Herfindahl, does not remove their significance. With the exception of
the Herfindahl when unionization is included, similar results are obtained for the other proxies.
Given that including all of proxies at once raises the explanatory power of the model only
slightly, focusing on the capital intensity and the strategic classification seems appropriate.
Potential biases
Omitted variables Given that proxies for the major determinants of disclosure policy that
have been mentioned in the literature were included in the models above, the main potential
source of omitted variable bias would be if these proxies were imperfect. We should be partic-
ularly worried about those variables for which omitted variable bias causes an overestimate of
the effect of the strategic nature of competition on disclosure policy, i.e. those variables which
are correlated with capital intensity and disclosure in opposite directions. If the proxies for
these variables were imperfect in this way, then some of the results reported above could be
due to omited variable bias.
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Table 8 reports the correlation of the control variables with disclosure measures, while Tables
2 and 3 report how they vary with strategic environment. Firm size is the only control variable
that is consistently significant, but it is positively correlated with both capital intensity and
disclosure, so imperfectly controlling for it should not be contributing to the results.2 9 The
two variables with opposite signed correlations are profitability and new debt capital; both
are positively correlated with disclosure and negatively correlated with capital intensity. The
negative correlations between capital intensity and both new debt raised and profitability are
a surprise and may be related to the use of assets in the denominator of both measures. In any
case, the role of the control variables other than firm size in the regressions in Tables 4 and 5
is very limited; even with better proxies their role is likely to remain limited.
Endogeneity The results in Tables 4-7 would be biased if the independent variables them-
selves depended on a firm's (perceived or actual) disclosure policy. For example, if a firm that
was exogenously regarded by the market as having a good disclosure policy faced lower capital
costs and thus decided to raise more capital, this could induce an upward correlation between
disclosure and capital raised, firm size, and capital intensity. In the case of capital intensity,
this would bias the coefficient on capital intensity positively toward zero. Positively biasing the
coefficients on the control variables firm size and capital raised could also affect the estimated
coefficient on capital intensity; in particular, a positive bias to the firm size coefficient would
negatively bias the coefficient on capital intensity.
I am not very worried about this type of endogeneity for .two reasons. First, the effect
of disclosure policy on capital costs is estimated to be very small (under 100 basis points)
relative to the role of technology in determining the optimal firm size and capital intensity of
an industry. Second, it is doubtful that all of the positive correlation between firm size and
disclosure is due to endogeneity, since disclosure is obviously relatively cheaper for a larger firm,
but even if it were, the correct specification would be to leave out the control for firm size. Even
in this specification, the coefficients on capital intensity are negative and significant (See Annex
Tables 2 and 3).
2 9Furthermore, using an alternative proxy, such as EBITDA, only increases the magnitude of the coefficients
on capital intensity.
82
3.3.2 Disclosure and the revenue bias in stock returns and managerial in-
centives
The second prediction of the model to be tested is whether a limited disclosure policy causes
stock returns and managerial incentives to place greater weight on revenue growth. In addition,
we would like to know whether firms competing in strategic substitutes have stock returns and
managerial incentives that place greater weight on revenue growth as the model predicts.
Measurement and data sources
The two major measurement choices in this section are how to measure executive compensation
and thus managerial incentives and how to determine whether the stock returns or managerial
incentives of certain firms are biased away from profits and towards revenue. Top executives
receive pay-for-performance incentives through salary increases, bonuses, long-term incentive
plans, and their option and stock holdings. Hall and Liebman (1998) report that the last two
sources of incentives have become especially important in the last decade. The COMPUSTAT
Executive Compensation data on these components of compensation for 14,324 executives from
1,913 North American firms from 1993-97 are summarized in Table 9.
The naive comparison of the relative size of executive compensation and the increase in
the value of stock and option holding in Table 9 suggests that the latter dwarfs the former
in providing managerial incentives. Adding the compensation and the nominal increase in the
value of an executive's assets is problematic for several reasons. First, whereas asset values
follow a random walk, compensation is persistent from year to year; a $100,000 raise represents
a greater increase in an executive's total wealth than a $100,000 increase in the value of stock
holdings. Second, assets are expected to increase in nominal value, especially in bull markets
like the 1993-97 period. The difference between the performance of an executive's firm-related
assets and a comparably leveraged market portfolio is a better indicator of the contribution of
a firm's stock performance to an executive's wealth. Labelling the natural increase in the value
of stock holdings during a bull market as compensation overstates the role of stock returns in
total compensation. Third, nominal compensation increases are also expected. The difference
between the actual and expected raises is more relevant than the nominal raise as a measure of
the change in an executive's wealth.
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Table 9 constructs a measure of an executive's firm-related wealth, which is the sum of
the permanent income value of compensation and the value of stock and option holdings. The
annual change in an executive's firm-related wealth is a function of the relative performance of
her stock and option holdings and the difference between her actual and expected compensation
increase. Using this measure, the relative roles of compensation and the change in value of stock
and option holdings in providing managerial incentives is much more equal.
The revenue and profit weights in stock returns, compensation, and managerial incentives
are measured using a common specification from the executive compensation literature:
dln(Y) = a dln(Sales) + b. dln(Ebitda) (3.3)
where Y is either a shareholder returns index, compensation, or the firm-related managerial
wealth measure in Table 9. The first differences specification removes firm fixed effects in the
level of managerial compensation as recommended by Murphy (1985). Three different measures
of profit are included since all three are used by practitioners as indicators of firm value.30
Results
Tables 10 presents estimations of (3) for different subsamples of firms. The left-hand panel
reveals that revenue growth has a greater weight and profit growth a smaller weight in industries
classified as strategic substitutes or with high capital intensity; the right-hand panel reveals that
the same is true for industries with limited disclosure. The results are more pronounced for
shareholder returns and total managerial wealth than for compensation, suggesting that any
incentive bias towards or away from revenue comes from manager's shareholdings rather than
their compensation.
The regressions in Table 11 test the statistical significance of the differences observed in
Tables 10 by interacting (3) with strategic environment proxies and disclosure measures. In
almost all cases the conclusions drawn above are statistically significant, although again the
results are less significant for compensation than for shareholder returns or managerial wealth.
3 0Alternative measures of profitability that were considered include earnings including and excluding extraor-
dinary items. Regressions including all three earnings items showed that stock returns were more responsive to
Ebitda than to the other two measures, and so Ebitda was used as the single proxy for accounting profit.
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Potential biases
The biggest potential concern with the above results is that shareholder returns could be biased
towards sales in capital-intensive industries for reasons having nothing to do with disclosure
policy. For example, if sales are indicative of future earnings, then for firms where future
earnings are a larger component of value (i.e., those with high price-earnings ratios) sales will
be more value relevant. If capital-intensive firms also have high PE ratios, this could explain
the results above. Likewise, since capital-intensive firms are larger, if larger or more unionized
firms had returns that were more dependent on sales growth, the results above might be biased.
Annex Table 4 replicates some of the results in Table 12 and adds controls for PE ratio and
firm size (measured using assets) and finds that the results are not sensitive to including these
controls.
3.3.3 The partial undoing of incentive biases through non-stock compensa-
tion
Compensation is both mechanically and implicitly related to stock returns. Part of compen-
sation takes the form of options and stock grants, long-term incentive plans and bonuses are
often explicitly tied to stock returns, and higher compensation is easier to justify when stock
returns are high. If a limited disclosure policy causes stock returns to be biased toward sales,
the relationship between compensation and stock returns will cause compensation to also be
biased towards sales.
The question this section asks is whether firms that compete in strategic substitutes aug-
ment or partially reverse the incentive biases in stock returns using non-stock compensation.
If observable contracts are used to achieve strategic commitment as in the FJS models, we
might expect to see firms augmenting the incentive bias in their stock returns with non-stock
incentives, in part because the bias towards revenue in stock returns is inherently limited by
the fact that investors ultimately value profits and reward revenue only to the extent that it is
informative about profits. On the contrary, if contracts are unobservable as in the model above,
we might under certain conditions expect to see firms partially undo incentive biases through
non-stock compensation.
Table 12 presents interactions of (3) with cash and non-stock compensation as the depen-
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Tdent variables and shareholder returns added as an independent variable. The results for the
interactions with strategic environment proxies suggest that firms competing in strategic sub-
stitutes do undo part of the incentive bias towards revenue with their non-stock compensation;
these results are consistent with our observation above that the biases toward revenue were
smaller for compensation than for stock returns and managerial wealth. The results for the
interactions with the disclosure measures, however, suggest that firms with limited disclosure
augment the resulting bias towards revenue. Taken together, these results are consistent with
firms that limit disclosure for strategic reasons undoing part of the resulting incentive bias while
firms that limit disclosure for other reasons do not.31
3.4 Conclusion
This paper has argued theoretically and documented empirically that firms competing in strate-
gic substitutes pursue more limited disclosure policies and that these firms' choice of disclosure
policy biases their managerial incentives in a strategically advantageous way. The paper of-
fers no evidence on whether firms are consciously taking account of strategic concerns or have
arrived at an advantageous disclosure policy through an evolutionary process or as part of a
general rule of competitive conduct. Even given that caveat, the idea that strategic concerns
might affect disclosure policy has more far reaching implications than the cross-sectional pat-
terns presented above. In particular, the model and evidence in this paper can help us think
more broadly about strategy and disclosure in three very different environments.
1. The U.S.-Japan managerial "myopia" debate. In the late 1980s, it was often argued
that Japanese firms derived a strategic advantage from their less meaningful quarterly
earnings figures32 and their larger, more involved-equity and debt holders (e.g., Jacobs,
1991). Less focus on quarterly earnings figures was argued to give Japanese firms two
strategic advantages, by allowing them to make investments in intangibles and to focus
on increasing market share. Stein (1989) provided a model of the first advantage in which
31We know that firms competing in strategic substitutes are only partially undoing the incentive bias because
non-stock compensation is included in the managerial wealth measures which we found to be significantly biased
towards revenue above.
32For example, in the late 1980s, Japanese firms were not required to report consolidated earnings statements;
reporting only parent company results allowed them to use transfer pricing to hide profits or losses in subsidiaries.
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less precise profit measures encourage greater investment intangibles that are unobserved
by the market. This paper can be viewed as a model of the second advantage. Using less
meaningful profit measures acts as a commitment to reward Japanese managers based on
market share growth, encouraging aggressive behavior by Japanese managers and passive
behavior by their U.S. rivals.
2. The Korean crisis. In Baily and Zitzewitz (1998), we argued that the recent crisis in Korea
was largely due overinvestment by Korean firms in heavy manufacturing industries 33 and
that this overinvestment could be traced to the absence within Korean firms of measures
of the economic profitability (i.e., profits net of capital costs) of divisions or products. We
attributed the absence of these measures in part to the fact that they were less relevant
for Korean firms historically given that access to capital was limited and that interest
subsidies, low labor costs, and less intense competition in domestic and international
markets helped ensure the profitability of investments. An alternative explanation sug-
gested by the model in this paper is that Korean firms in capital intensive industries were
cultivating a reputation for aggressive behavior in order to encourage exit and discourage
investment by their foreign competitors and that eschewing profitability measures was
part of building this reputation. It is certainly true that Korean firms had developed a
reputation for destroying the global profitability of industries they entered (e.g., textiles,
shipbuilding, DRAMs, volume autos), that this reputation had some strategic benefits,
and that their apparent disregard for earning high returns on capital contributed to this
reputation. It is less clear, however, whether not adopting economic profit measures was
a conscious decision made with this reputation in mind.
3. Newly public e-commerce firms. E-commerce firms are notorious for earnings figures that
are difficult to interpret. A typical problem is that selling, general, and administrative
(SG&A) expenses are greater than gross margins, but SG&A includes recurring expenses,
one-time expenses, and investments (e.g., in marketing) that cannot be credibly separated.
33By 1995, Korean firms in autos, steel minimills, DRAMs, and most of food processing had invested to 100
percent of U.S. capital intensity (comapred with an economy average of 33 percent) despite achieving only 50
percent of U.S. total factor productivity. Low returns were an inevitable result. Baily and Zitzewitz (1998) was
based heavily on work we while at the McKinsey Global Institute (1998).
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As a result, the stock market often responds to revenue growth as well as or instead
of earnings growth. Managers interested in medium-term valuations therefore have an
incentive to increase revenue as well as profits. These incentives may be partly responsible
for promotions that often look more revenue than profit maximizing.3 4 The model in this
paper suggests that the imperfect profit figures and the aggressive managerial behavior
that they promise may be strategically valuable in deterring participation or investment
by competitors.
In summary, this paper shows that by relaxing the assumption that contracts are observ-
able, one can find evidence that managerial incentives are important for strategic as well as
organizational efficiency reasons. The paper also provides evidence that accounting and disclo-
sure policies are affected and should be affected by strategic concerns as well as more common
considerations such as the cost of capital and the cost of information provision. These two
broad findings have implications for management and future research alike.
3 4Examples include the 20-40% off discounts offered to existing customers by Peapod, an online grocery
delivery service, and the $75-400 new account bonuses offered by online brokerages and banks, sometimes without
requiring an initial deposit. These promotions could also be motivated by switching costs (Klemperer, 1987) or
a desire to develop a reputation for low pricing (Bagwell, Ramey, and Spulber, 1997).
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Table 2. Summary statistics for North American and World sample
Mean Std. Dev Obs. Firms Obs./Firm
North American sample
Disclosure measures
AIMR disclosure score Percent 72 14 1,958 415 4.7
Held conference call from 3/97-5/97 Percent 6.1 24 9,825 9,825 1
Unqualified audit opinion with no explanatory notes Percent 74 44 42,143 6,813 6.2
Unqualified audit opinion Percent 97 16 42,143 6,813 6.2
Big 6 auditor Percent 87 34 41,852 6,787 6.2
Firm characteristics
Assets $ millions 2,336 10,279 31,880 4,596 6.9
ROIC (measured as EBIT/Assets) Percent 6.5 14.1 31,498 4,570 6.9
New equity-assets Percent 2.7 10.3 18,457 3,692 5.0
New debt-assets Percent 5.3 16.3 17,614 3,629 4.9
Short-term debt-assets Percent 2.4 5.4 30,826 4,540 6.8
Log assets-sales ratio 0.06 0.86 30,990 4,467 6.9
Industry characteristics (whole economy)
Strategic substitutes dummy Percent 0.50 0.50 79,205 7,055 11.2
Log capital-value added ratio (NIPA data) 1.5 1.4 112,977 10,090 11.2
Unionization rate 1995 Percent 13 10 112,977 10,090 11.2
Industry characteristics (manufacturing only)
Log capital-value added ratio (NBER data) 1992 .0.89 0.56 56,839 5,079 11.2
Average total factor productivity growth 1987-97 Percent 1.5 2.8 56,839 5,079 11.2
Herfindahl index 1992 601 471 56,381 5,039 11.2
Unionization rate 1995 Percent 17 11 55,411 4,948 11.2
World sample
Disclosure measures
Unqualified audit opinion with no explanatory notes Percent 82 38 50,958 8,671 5.9
Unqualified audit opinion Percent 98 13 50,958 8,671 5.9
Reported consolidated results Percent 95 22 50,958 8,671 5.9
Used U.S. GAAP Percent 1.0 10.0 50,958 8,671 5.9
Big 6 auditor Percent 71 45 50,958 8,671 5.9
Firm characteristics
Assets $ millions 2,131 8,256 50,957 8,671 5.9
ROIC (measured as EBIT/Assets) Percent 12.0 11.5 47,937 8,379 5.7
New equity-assets Percent 1.6 8.4 50,958 8,671 5.9
New debt-assets Percent 3.5 12.5 50,958 8,671 5.9
Short-term debt-assets Percent 39 18 50,958 8,671 5.9
Log assets-sales ratio 0.03 0.75 50,672 8,615 5.9
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Table 3. Summary statistics for North American and World sample by strategic classificatior
All observations Disclosure score available
All Subs. Comps. All Subs. Comps.
North American sample
Observations 31,880 13,755 7,671 1,798 931 482
Firms 4,596 2,036 997 368 191 99
Disclosure measures
AIMR disclosure score 72.0 69.3 76.9 72.0 69.3 76.9
Held conference call from 3/97-5/97 16.6 14.7 20.2 40.5 40.4 42.3
Unqualified audit opinion with no explanatory notes 76.5 74.6 79.6 65.7 64.6 72.0
Unqualified audit opinion 98.3 97.9 99.0 99.7 99.7 99.8
Big 6 auditor 88.8 89.0 88.5 98.8 98.9 97.9
Firm characteristics
Assets 2,336 3,183 1,408 7,589 8,324 5,644
ROIC (measured as EBIT/Assets) 6.5 4.7 8.7 11.9 11.0 13.1
New equity-assets 2.7 3.1 2.4 -0.3 0.0 0.2
New debt-assets 5.3 4.2 7.5 6.6 5.5 8.2
Short-term debt-assets 2.4 2.3 2.4 1.5 1.5 1.2
Log assets-sales ratio 0.06 0.41 -0.24 -0.04 0.12 -0.27
Industry characteristics (whole economy)
Log capital-value added ratio (NIPA data) 1.71 2.85 0.62 1.55 2.22 0.66
Unionization rate 1995 14.9 18.8 7.4 17.3 22.9 6.8
Industry characteristics (manufacturing only)
Log capital-value added ratio (NBER data) 1992 1.00 1.33 0.49 1.21 1.50 0.52
Average total factor productivity growth 1987-97 1.3 0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 -1.5
Herfindahl index 1992 621 683 440 632 647 315
Unionization rate 1995 18.6 24.2 11.5 21.1 23.8 10.6
World sample
Observations 50,957 15,711 16,208
Firms 8,671 3,051 3,077
Disclosure measures
Unqualified audit opinion with no explanatory notes 82.4 81.6 84.5
Unqualified audit opinion 98.2 96.7 98.8
Reported consolidated results 95.1 92.5 96.3
Used U.S. GAAP 1.0 1.0 0.7
Big 6 auditor 71.3 67.1 72.4
Firm characteristics
Assets 2,131 2,302 1,618
ROIC (measured as EBIT/Assets) 12.0 10.6 12.4
New equity-assets 1.6 2.4 1.3
New debt-assets 3.5 3.8 3.8
Short-term debt-assets 39.1 35.8 42.1
Log assets-sales ratio 0.03 0.39 -0.26
91
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Annex Tble 2. ffect of industry strategic nature on disclosure policy -- North American sample
The regressions that are summarized in Table 4 are reported in their entirety. Sets of regressions using different
measures of the nature of industry competition are reported in each panel. Each panel contains three specifications
for each dependent variable that include different controls. The regressions using
ratio include only manufacturing firms. The notes on Table 4 apply here as well.
the NER industry capital-output
AIMR score Conf. Call no opn o Unqual. opin. Big 6 auditornotes
Dep. variable type Continuous Probit Probit Probit Probit
Obs. 597 1494 11106 8368 11069
Firms 193 1494 2310 2061 2302
R-sq. 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.33 0.21
Dep. variable mean 0.19 0.73 0.99 0.91
Strategic substitutes dummy -8.867*** -0.206** -0.199**- 0.064 0.242**
(1.736) (0.082) {0.043) (0.172) (0.094)
Assets 
^
-0.2 -11.661*** -0.874*** 0.194'** -0.427*** -0.688***
(2.429) (0.091) (0.027) (0.086) (0.047)
New equity-to-assets -0.462 -0.172*** 0.117*** 0.097** -0.022
(0.559) (0.047) (0.017) (0.041) (0.020)
New debt-to-assets 0.200 0.008 0.076*** 0.117* -0.033
(0.590) (0.044) (0.017) (0.055) (0.023)
Short-term debt-to-assets -2.465** -0.007 -0.142** -0.128'** -0.024
(1.195) (0.070) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027)
ROIC 0.745 0.122 0.149*** 0.074 -0.054
(0.961) (0.092) (0.024) (0.051) (0.035)
Strategic substitutes dummy -8.450*** -0.258*** -0.152** -0.206** 0.111
(1.444) (0.075) (0.034) (0.082) (0.068)
Assets ^ -0.2 -9.148'** -0.839**- 0.060'** -0.335*** -0.559***
(1.475) (0.074) (0.018) (0.033) (0.027)
Strategic substitutes dummy -7.068*** -0.126* -0.152*** -0.231*** 0.048
(1.520) (0.070) (0.034) (0.081) (0.063)
AIMR score Conf. Call Unqual. opin. no Unqual. opin. Big 6 auditor
notes
Dep. variable type Continuous Probit Probit Probit Probit
Obs. 793 2171 17102 13147 17041
Firms 257 2171 3569 3252 3558
R-sq. 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.32 0.19
Dep. variable mean 0.20 0.74 0.99 0.90
Industry capital-output -3.564*** -0.127*** -0.046* -0.015 0.039
ratio (NIPA) (0.899) (0.042) (0.019) (0.061) (0.032)
Assets ^ -0.2 -7.814*** -0.860*** 0.178*** -0.417** -0.661**
(2.126) (0.069) (0.021) (0.069) (0.037)
New equity-to-assets -0.279 -0.139*** 0.124*** 0.062 -0.020
(0.472) (0.039) (0.014) (0.039) (0.016)
New debt-to-assets -0.316 0.037 0.070*** 0.007 -0.042**
(0.474) (0.038) (0.014) (0.049) (0.018)
Short-term debt-to-assets -1.404'* -0.032 -0.144'** -0.112** -0.042**
(0.663) (0.061) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019)
ROIC 0.249 0.051 0.187'** 0.162'** -0.025
(0.896) (0.066) (0.021) (0.046) (0.025)
Industry capital-output -4.046*** -0.172*** -0.018 -0.073*** . -0.012
ratio (NIPA) (0.662) (0.036) (0.014) (0.024) (0.022)
Assets ^ -0.2 -7.326*** -0.788*** 0.043*** -0.330*** -0.559***
(1.304) (0.056) (0.014) (0.028) (0.022)
Industry capital-output -4.096*** -0.141*** -0.014 -0.117** -0.078* **
ratio (NIPA) (0.685) (0.030) (0.014) (0.025) (0.022)
_~ ~ ~ ~AM s enua. o i .
AIHR score Conf. Call nual opin. no Unqual. opin. Big 6 auditornotes
Dep. variable type Continuous Probit Probit Probit Probit
Obs. 559 1292 11266 8937 11230
Firms 174 1292 2268 2135 2264
R-sq. 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.30 0.19
Dep. variable mean 0.21 0.72 0.99 0.90
Industry capital-output -2.461*** -0.075' -0.060*-^ -0.026 0.028
ratio (NBER) (0.774) 0.043) (0.022) (0.098) (0.069)
Assets ^ -0.2 -7.63**- -0.811**' 0.161-** -0.391*** -0.668***
(2.448) (0.082) (0.026) (0.080) (0.046)
New equity-to-assets 0.273 -0.112* 0.116'** 0.023 -0.005
(0.579) (0.058) (0.018) (0.051) (0.021)
New debt-to-assets -0.462 0.059 0.056'** -0.022 -0.041*
(0.571) (0.050) (0.018) (0.064) (0.022)
Short-term debt-to-assets -0.951 -0.100 -0.144**' -0.097*** -0.032
(0.726) (0.087) (0.017) (0.027) (0.023)
ROIC 0.586 -0.049 0.185** 0.167*** -0.065**
(1.130) (0.076) (0.025) (0.052) (0.029)
Industry capital-output -2.765*** -0.085** -0.062** -0.155**' 0.010
ratio (NBER) (0.614) (0.037) (0.019) (0.034) (0.046)
Assets ^ -0.2 -5.380*** -0.722** 0.012 -0.340** -0.569-*-
(1.745) (0.066) (0.019) (0.038) (0.030)
Industry capital-output -2.397* 0.027 -0.066*** -0.027 0.176**
ratio (NBER) (0.620) (0.034) (0.018) (0.031) (0.043)
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AIMR score Conf. Call o Unqual. opin. Big 6 auditor
notes
Dep. variable type Continuous Probit Probit Probit Probit
Obs. 793 2133 16863 12965 16817
Firms 257 2133 3504 3200 3495
R-sq. 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.33 0.18
Dep. variable mean 0.20 0.74 0.99 0.91
Firm capital-output ratio -5.409^** -0.149'* -0.003 -0.006 0.047
(1.159) (0.043) (0.019) (0.050) (0.032)
Assets ^ -0.2 -9.89... -0.872** 0.185'^ -0.385** -0.642***
(2.120) (0.071) (0.022) (0.075) (0.037)
New equity-to-assets -0.059 -0.127^** 0.122'** 0.012 -0.016
(0.477) (0.039) (0.014) (0.040) (0.017)
New debt-to-assets 0.078 0.049* 0.073*** 0.056 -0.051'**
(0.481) (0.038) (0.015) (0.049) (0.018)
Short-term debt-to-assets -1.26' -0.027 -0.141'** -0.109'** -0.047***
(0.662) (0.060) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019)
ROIC -0.601 0.022 0.203'** 0.166** -0.017
(0.943) (0.070) (0.023) (0.053) (0.028)
Firm capital-output ratio -4.196'** -0.229'* -0.034'** -0.113'** -0.024
(0.713) (0.036) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019)
Assets ^ -0.2 -8.967***' -0.799*** 0.050**' -0.306*** -0.555**
(1.327) (0.058) (0.015) (0.030) (0.023)
Firm capital-output ratio -3.066'** -0.147'** -0.031'** -0.162'** -0.072***
(0.717) (0.027) (0.012) (0.019) (0.020)
AIM]{ score Cof al Unqual. opin. noAIMR score Conf. Call Unnnotes Unqual. opin. Big 6 auditorDep. variable type Continuous Probit Probit Probit Probites
Dep. variable type Continuous Probit Probit Probit Probit
Obs.
Firms
R-sq.
Dep. variable mean
Industry capital-output
ratio (firm data)
Assets 
^
-0.2
New equity-to-assets
New debt-to-assets
Short-term debt-to-assets
ROIC
Industry capital-output
ratio (firm data)
Assets 
^
-0.2
Industry capital-output
ratio (firm data)
793
257
0.16
-3.590***
(0.702)
-7 .73***
(2.066)
-0.247
(0.473)
-0.313
(0.475)
-1.307*
(0.663)
0.296
(0.879)
-4.013'**
(0.493)
-7.180'**
(1.267)
-4 . 045'**
(0.505)
2171
2171
0.15
0.20
-0.085***
(0 032)
-0.847***
(0.069)
-0.141**
(0 039)
0.034
(0 038)
-0 026
(0 060)
0.071
(0 067)
-0.129'**
(0 028)
-0.780**
(0.056)
-0.124**'
(0.027)
17102
3569
0.12
0.74
-0.044**
(0.018)
0.180**
(0.021)
0.123'**
(0.014)
0.070***'
(0.014)
-0.143**
(0 .013)
0.190'**
(0.021)
-0.025*
(0.013)
0.044'**
(0.014)
-0.020
(0.013)
13147
3252
0.32
0.99
-0.042
(0 .071)
-0 415 '*
(0 .069)
0.063*
(0.039)
0.006
(0.049)
-0.112'**
(0.020)
0 .161'**
(0 .046)
-0.082***
(0.029)
-0.329***
(0.028)
-0 .137'
(0.029)
17041
3558
0.20
0 .90
0.086**
(0.038)
-0.670***
(0 037)
-0 023
(0.016)
-0.042***
(0.018)
-0.043***
(0 019)
-0 021
(0.026)
0.004
(0.027)
-0.561**
(0.022)
-0.067*'*
(0.026)
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Annex Table 3. Effect of industry strategic nature on disclosure policy -- World sample
The regressions that are summarized in Table 5 are reported in their entirety. Sets of regressions using
different measures of the nature of industry competition are reported in each panel. Each panel contains
three specifications for each dependent variable that include different controls. The regressions using th
NBER industry capital-output ratio include only manufacturing firms. The notes on Table 5 apply here as
well.
Unqualified Unulfd
Consolidated opUnuaified Unqualified US GAAP Big 6 auditor
explan. notes
Obs. 15339 30533 30348 11300 30525
Firms 3226 5656 5594 2380 5657
Pseudo R-sq. 0.323 0.182 0.200 0.317 0.398
Dep. variable mean 0.913 0.822 0.978 0.023 0.740
Strategic substitutes dummy -0.043 -0.279*** -0.413*** -0.034 0.025
(0.073) (0.030) (0.063) (0.172) (0.046)
Assets ^ -.2 -3.215*** 0.426*** -0.348 -9.627*** -2.818***
(0.457) (0.135) (0.239) (1.623) (0.176)
New equity-to-assets 0.666* 0.344*** -0.090 0.882 0.201
(0.343) (0.125) (0.298) (0.833) (0.135)
New debt-to-assets 0.442*** 0.288*** 0.068 -0.059 -0.235***
(0.163) (0.079) (0.146) (0.399) (0.084)
Short-term debt-to-assets 0.558** -1.063** -0.656*** -0.802 0.197
(0.255) (0.087) (0.175) (0.488) (0.122)
ROIC 0.340 1.132*** 0.853*** 0.842 0.086
(0.374) (0.125) (0.158) (1.143) (0.130)
Strategic substitutes dummy -0.034 -0.225*** -0.398*** 0.033 0.011
(0.070) (0.029) (0.060) (0.155) (0.045)
Assets 
^
-0.2 -3.101*** 0.337** -0.491** -9.558*** -2.793***
(0.406) (0.132) (0.226) (1.653) (0.176)
Strategic substitutes dummy -0.048 -0.228*** -0.396*** 0.122 0.020
(0.066) (0.029) (0.060) (0.140) (0.044)
Obs. 11598 26948 26142 7475 26938
Firms 2670 4887 4703 1731 4889
Pseudo R-sq. 0.422 0.221 0.230 0.264 0.388
Dep. variable mean 0.894 0.806 0.985 0.048 0.750
Industry capital-output -0.178*** -0.121*** -0.103* -0.132 -0.048
ratio (NBER) (0.067) (0.024) (0.058) (0.111) (0.039)
Assets ^ -.2 -3.597*** 0.536*** -0.501 -9.227*** -3.427***
(0.556) (0.141) (0.329) (1.435) (0.207)
New equity-to-assets 0.850** 0.703*** -0.226 0.746 0.182
(0.365) (0.150) (0.482) (0.978) (0.163)
New debt-to-assets 0.638*** 0.061 -0.039 0.392 -0.241***
(0.182) (0.094) (0.202) (0.349) (0.088)
Short-term debt-to-assets 1.176*** -1.425*** -0.599** -0.977** 0.051
(0.322) (0.101) (0.262) (0.490) (0.145)
ROIC 0.340 1.078*** 0.804*** 1.903 -0.245*
(0.400) (0.132) (0.199) (1.259) (0.141)
Industry capital-output -0.188*** -0.115*** -0.085 -0.170 -0.049
ratio (NBER) (0.065) (0.023) (0.055) (0.109) (0.039)
Assets ^ -0.2 -3.571*** 0.520*** -0.523* -9.174*** -3.344***
(0.505) (0.138) (0.300) (1.472) (0.198)
Industry capital-output -0.101 -0.138*** -0.067 0.009 0.084**
ratio (NBER) (0.062) (0.023) (0.053) (0.095) (0.036)
Obs. 26760 54861 54500 22141 54846
Firms 5368 9393 9291 4393 9395
Pseudo R-sq. 0.419 0.194 0.154 0.306 0.376
Dep. variable mean 0.904 0.810 0.981 0.024 0.757
Firm capital-output ratio -0.220*** -0.132*** -0.130*** -0.346*** -0.049**
(0.045) (0.015) (0.025) (0.088) (0.022)
Assets 
^
-.2 -3.210** 0.557*** 0.006 -8.825*** -2.968***
(0.328) (0.100) (0.184) (1.094) (0.137)
New equity-to-assets 0.646** 0.564*** 0.185 1.112* 0.227**
(0.262) (0.095) (0.203) (0.611) (0.102)
New debt-to-assets 0.659*** 0.220*** 0.011 0.079 -0.169***
(0.129) (0.061) (0.111} (0.282) (0.063)
Short-term debt-to-assets 0.377** -1.237*** -0.543*** -1.243*** -0.018
(0.193) (0.072) (0.141) (0.346) (0.100)
ROIC -0.525** 0.991*** 0.559*** 0.959 0.040
(0.240) (0.102) (0.133) (0.785) (0.108)
Firm capital-output ratio -0.213*** -0.072*** -0.101*** -0.227*** -0.049**
(0.041) (0.014) (0.022) (0.079) (0.019)
Assets ^ -0.2 -3.028*** 0.563*** -0.028 -8.534*** -2.960***
(0.291) (0.098) (0.180) (1.092) (0;133)
Firm capital-output ratio -0.169*** -0.083*** -0.101*** -0.064 -0.011
(0.040) (0.013) (0.022) (0.056) (0.020)
104
Obs. 24440 50160 49815 20598 50128
Firms 4966 8733 8631 4107 8729
Pseudo R-sq. 0.422 0.188 0.187 0.309 0.384
Dep. variable mean 0.901 0.816 0.982 0.025 0.753
Industry capital-output -0.040* -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.059* 0.008
ratio (NIPA) (0.023) (0.008) (0.012) (0.036) (0.012)
Assets ^ -.2 -3.335*** 0.499*** -0.410'* -8.652*** -3.027***
(0.371) (0.104) (0.206) (1.095) (0.144)
New equity-to-assets 0.696** 0.476*** 0.033 0.973 0.202*
(0.279) (0.100) (0.252) (0.609) (0.108)
New debt-to-assets 0.526*** 0.160** -0.060 -0.091 -0.236***
(0.131) (0.063) (0.124) (0.286) (0.065)
Short-term debt-to-assets 0.630*** -1.112*** -0.495*** -0.794** 0;097
(0.211) (0.072) (0.159) (0.338) (0.097)
ROIC 0.245 1.178*** 0.844*** 1.654*** 0.134
(0.321) (0.102) (0.142) (0.549) (0.105)
Industry capital-output -0.025 -0.055*** -0.065*** -0.049* 0.006
ratio (NIPA) (0.020) (0.007) (0.011) (0.028) (0.012)
Assets ^ -0.2 -3.193** 0.411*** -0.486** -8.702*** -3.011***
(0.331) (0.102) (0.196) (1.114) (0.143)
Industry capital-output -0.015 -0.058*** -0.062*** -0.005 0.016
ratio (NIPA) (0.019) (0.007) (0.010) (0.026) (0.011)
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Appendix A
Maximum likelihood estimation for
Chapter 2
In this appendix we assume that rather than calculating expectations for a and b, clients
calculate maximum likelihood estimates. We can think about combining the prior distribution
g(a,A) and the function b(a,A) into a prior on a and P = b- 1, which we will call f(a,fl). For
tractability, we will also assume that the prior distribution g(a, A) is such that the distribution
f(a, p) is concave in logs for both variables, i.e. d2 Inf a,) < 0 and in f(a,3) < 0 Vx, a condit iondaz - df]2- -
that is satisfied by the normal and chi-squared distributions, for example. We also assume that
V = Var(yjlxj) is known.
Given these assumptions, the log likelihood function is:
- ~lA(Ž2)\ Vl1 - X ,3lnL(x,y,a,B) = Elnb(l) + -n( I )+ln[f(a,3)],
j=1 j=1
where 0(.) is the standard normal p.d.f. The maximum likelihood estimators of a and b satisfy
the conditions:
^2 j= 1 fa(aMLE,MLE) . MLE
aMLE - IMLE + f(aMLE, 3MLE) 
VMLE = (1+ )l [ji1 XjYj f (aMLE, PMLE) V ]
aMLE Ljl f(aMLE,I3 MLE) j;= xz
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We have assumed that fa is monotonically decreasing in a, so the second term in the expression
for a will be positive (negative) when a is less (greater) than the mode of the prior distribution.
2'2The maximum likelihood estimate of a will thus be between MLEVar(xj) and the mode of the
prior. The first factor in the maximum likelihood estimate of 3 induces a bias toward zero that
is a artifact of our taking a maximum likelihood approach to estimation. Ignoring this factor,
the maximum likelihood estimate of 3 will be between POLS and the mode of the prior, with
more weight being placed on the prior when V is large.
Thus the MLE is similar in structure to the estimating approach assumed in (9):
(3C + .P) .Var(xj) + 6 ao
ap --' 1+7+6
The estimate of # is some weighted average of the observed PCL and the mean of the prior
2 
distribution 0. Ability is estimated in turn as some weighted average of MLEVar(xj) and
the mean of the prior distribution. The weight placed on the prior belief about exaggeration,
7, is increasing in V and decreasing in J, i.e. it is higher when realizations are noisy or when
the number of observations is small.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1 in Chapter 2
We know that E(LJKI0J) is between w-1 /J and SK . Since w-l3J = E(OKIOJ), this implies
that 13K will be above E(0JKIJ) when it is above client's expectation based on the observed
pJ. If we define A/i = K - E(,JK,13J), we can rewrite the first order condition as
wE(8JK,6J) 2 - +yp A
E(3JK IlJ) + 3 = wE( JK) P + 
E(PJ )+ A-rn2+w(Afl)2E(1 - ) - Aw-E(KI'J) ( I+w. A
- yo2 + W(zL)2
OK = E(JK[J) + A/3 = A+w .L
If we define 1 = A-1(A - 2) to be the optimal one-period beta, we can multiply both sides
of the above expression by A-1(A + w-/ Ap)to get:
/K = 1 -
wE(PJK113J) Ad
A
This implies that 3K is less than /1 if and only if it is greater than E(JK1IJ) and E( 3KI/J).
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Appendix C
Proof of Propositions 3 and 5 in
Chpater 3
C.1 Proposition 3
If we call m = [ fi the vector
- Ti J 
principal's contracting problem as Vm =
of incentives, we can write the first order condition to the
[:00] . If we take the total differential of this first
order condition with respect to profit noise, we get that:
- Vmm dni
dni
-par h J --= 0 X
h .,t 
ini i
dni
dni
po + h-71
Hni i
The conditions for di < 0, i > 0 are respectively (using the fact that the determinant of
Vmm is positive at an optimum):
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dm
Vmm-dni
dVm
dni
= V;I
h VTp, < -pl him Vx (C.1)
Vw < - f ni ' vp (C.2)
Taking the derivative of the principal's first order condition yields the following expressions
for Vop, Vop = Vy, Van:
Vp = TPP(1 - O') - ~ 7- - p(ni + o-) 
Voy = 7(1-Y)P-7t 7' -P77r + 
Van = 7y(1 - )- . 7 - pa - V,,
where 7roo = W = 2ir' -lHaaW-l7, 7r = 27r'W-1 IaaW-1 ra = 7 = 7rtW -1RaaW- 17 a+
ra W-lrIaaW- 17Ta, 7-rg = ra -IIaaW-1ra + W-'RaaW-'ra = r = W- 1RaaW-lra +
r'W-lHIaaW-ra, rg = 2r'W- 1RaaW-lra (ignoring any terms involving Waaa since we as-
sumed these third-order effects would be small).
We know that all these terms are negative since W - 1 is positive definite and IIaa, Raa
are negative definite (since this implies that the symmetrical expressions are negative, which
together with the 7rv = 7ryo and r = 7rw identities, implies that the non-symmetrical terms
are). The terms involving p are all positive when .,, > 0. We know that when accounting
incentives are costless (h = v = 0), conditions (4) and (5) are satisfied since Vet, V , Va < 0.
We also know that when accounting incentives are very costly (h - oo), conditions (4) and (5)
converge to V: < -Vo ,, and V < -Vp + L since 4 - p. Since conditions (4) and (5)
hold for the two extreme values of h, they also hold for intermediate values.
C.2 Proposition 5
The first statement follows from Assumption 4 and Proposition 3. The second follows from
the fact that [(a' is positive (negative) when A is negative (positive) definite,the~ fct~u that L\ n! "0- /J[- AanJ is positive (negative) when A is negative (positive) definite,
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since aoi aa-i is positive definite (like all outer products of a vector). Since the participa-
tion deterrence effect, (an)' ai, is always negative, the strategic response effect, - Aan, is
positive (negative) when A is negative (positive) definite.
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